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THE PRESENT DOCTRINAL CRISIS

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I

The irreligion of modern man is neither voluntary nor accidental. He did not discard his former faith because he preferred to do without it. Nor did he lose it unwittingly by the wayside through carelessness or preoccupation. On the contrary his religion died within him despite his efforts to keep it alive. And even though in his lighter moments he may boast of compensations, in his heart he feels himself impoverished by its absence. This is evident from the wistfulness that he exhibits in his attitude toward those who still have access to spiritual certitudes and consolations. Modern man would be glad to regain a religious faith but he is unable to do so. And his inability is no mere lack of will or obstinate wrongheadedness. It is rather an inhibition of his natural faculties imposed upon him by historic forces and social disciplines.

Since this is so no effort to restore religion in the modern world will be generally effective unless it is grounded in a realistic understanding of the origin and nature of modern irreligion. To regard only the dire results will not suffice, one must consider also

the causes which have produced them. The irreligion which afflicts man today is not a single effect produced from without but an internal degeneration of western culture. It is not merely an absence of religion, it is the presence of its opposite. We are not irreligious merely because we are lax, indifferent and over-busy with other things. We are irreligious because we hold convictions which are incompatible with religion. And these convictions in the main are by-products of recent developments in the field of secular scholarship. Modern irreligion is therefore of a peculiar nature. It differs wholly from any other form of heresy or scepticism that has previously existed. Indeed it can be comprehended only when one compares it with the irreligions of other periods.

II

When Christian history is viewed in perspective it is seen to be a record of three successive period styles in irreligion. In the technical language of divinity these may be distinguished as the theological, the ecclesiological and the anthropological heresies. In the first period men raised questions concerning the nature of God and the person of Our Lord. In the second, doubters turned their attention to such matters as the organization of the Church, the validity of the sacraments, and the authority of the clergy. And finally, in modern times a third phase has developed in which irreligion denies the Christian conception of humanity.

Nowadays, with greater or less clarity man conceives himself to be only a biological species, different in many respects from other animals but essentially of the same order. He regards his mind as an automatic system of conditioned neural reflexes. He describes his personality as a constellation of attitudes produced by his environment and his experience. He recognizes no higher sanction for conduct than expediency, and no higher criterion of truth than instrumental efficiency. Thus his irreligion is a body of positive convictions concerning his own nature and his place in the universe. And these convictions not only preclude a normal Christian experience, they invalidate the whole fabric of civiliza-

tion. In place of self-discipline, modern man has set up the ideal of self-expression. To achieve this he practices the morals and arts of the jungle. Denying the ultimate potency of right, he necessarily has recourse to force, fraud, oppression and warfare. No longer finding dignity in manhood itself, he seeks to regain his fallen pride in the cult of a pseudo-biological racial theory. Beaten down by his sense of futility as an individual, he seeks as the goal of his aspiration an aggrandisement of his class or nation. Torn between his theory of absolute determinism and his grandiose sense of absolute intellectual competence, he evades madness only by abdicating his personality to a leader. And, terrified by the solitudes of his own soul, he prefers regimentation to liberty.

Nor can any one who knows this modernistic temper in himself and in his fellows doubt for a moment that these anthropological convictions are the basis of today's irreligion. Indeed, if the modern mind could only believe in man's spirituality it would find no difficulty whatever in believing in a spiritual God and in a spiritual Church, the meeting place of the creator and the created.

III

With varying emphasis through the centuries the Church has performed three distinct functions. In the older terminology these would be described as the ministry of grace, the ministry of prophecy, and the ministry of teaching, but for verbal economy in the following discussion we shall call them sacrament, philanthropy and doctrine.

The ministry of grace is the process whereby Christian experience is initiated and maintained in humanity. It works not only directly through the sacraments themselves, but also indirectly through all forms of worship and devotion as well as by community of membership and activity in ecclesiastical and sub-ecclesiastical organizations.

The philanthropic function of the Church has both its communal and its personal aspects. On the one side the Church is evidently bound to appraise by Christian standards the structure,

motives and programs of the social order, denounce what is evil, and advocate reforms and worthy achievements. On the other side the Church is equally bound to inspire all good works of mercy and charity to the unfortunate.

The third function of the Church is the ministry of teaching, or the formulation and spread of Christian doctrines. Although Christianity itself is an immediate awareness of spiritual experience, this can be rationally apprehended and expounded only as a body of specific intellectual recognitions and judgments. The history of the Church is, therefore, a record of doctrinal development. Each age has faced its own theoretical problems; to refute heretics and win converts it has had to rationalize and justify an intellectual religious attitude over against the dominant period style of irreligion. But always it has had to do this in terms of the scholarship available in the period. Consequently on occasion the Church has had to correct its own earlier doctrinal errors; with the growth of knowledge, opinions once declared essential to orthodoxy (e.g., pre-Copernican cosmology or former theories of Scriptural inspiration) were later seen to be false and so were tacitly repudiated. Nor is there any historical reason for assuming that either form of doctrinal development has yet been completed.

Actually the Church cannot exist in its normal state without performing all three of these functions. Theoretically, of course, the ministry of grace is central and the others are subsidiary—philanthropy to keep human society, and doctrine to keep the human mind, in fit states for sacramental experience. But practically these secondary functions, being indispensable, may be regarded as coördinate with sacrament.

IV

Yet there have been but few periods since the Apostolic Age when the Church has maintained an exact functional equilibrium. In the Early Middle Ages doctrine was emphasized at the expense of both sacrament and philanthropy. Even the Apologists and the Fathers have surprisingly little to say apart from doctrinal

matters, and what little they do say is usually quite incidental. In the Later Middle Ages sacrament alone was adequately ministered. Doctrine became an esoteric lore of theological experts; in place of orthodox opinions, the laity and even the working clergy had access only to a folklore of hagiology. And at the same time Christian philanthropy was generally limited to its individualistic aspects of charity and mercy. Instead of social criticism and reform, Churchmen attempted to dominate the state, and often suffered grievously under reactions in the opposite direction.

The Protestant Revolution was primarily a violent shift of the functional pattern. Impulses to social and doctrinal reform at first ran in parallel, but soon the former died and doctrine claimed alone to be Christianity. As this trend was exaggerated a time came when every layman was required to become an expert theologian. The church was physically transformed from a temple into a lecture hall. In place of sacramental activities there were hour-long doctrinal sermons. To God were addressed not prayers but explanations of Himself, His being and attributes. The hungry were given not bread but tracts and catechisms.

The Evangelical Movement, in turn, was chiefly a revival of Christian philanthropy. Though doctrine was still greatly over-emphasized a partial restoration of sacrament was also effected. Still later the various Neo-catholic movements all exhibited at first an apostolic perfection of functional balance, but they soon came to exaggerate both sacrament and social reform; doctrine became less the mind of a living church than a nostalgic memory of former vitalities.

In contemporary Protestantism generally, the functional nadir has been reached. Sacramental activities have wholly ceased except for a few aesthetic ceremonials. Scholarship and personal charity alike are regarded as purely secular matters and as such they are surrendered to the state. Doctrine has been so completely voided of all intellectual Christian content that only a few archaic technical expressions survive to show that it once existed. Indeed, little remains but a perverted social philanthropy and that is religious in name only. It certainly is no longer Christian.

Lacking faith, it conceives the ideal society as a human contrivance, not as a consummation of cosmic principles; lacking hope, it regards social salvation as a possibility, not as providentially inevitable; and lacking charity, it is animated by resentment, hatred and vengeance more often than by love and gentleness. In fifty years the Social Gospel, which was truly Christian in its origins, has thus degenerated. And today there are many ministers who retain their office for the sole purpose of advocating secular reforms. They regard the Christian sacraments as barbarous survivals of magic, and Christian doctrine as a tissue of ignorance and superstition. Indeed, some of them believe that the Church itself has always been an instrument whereby the few have exploited the many, except as social reformers, like themselves, have wrested it temporarily from the hands of the oppressors.

In those modern communions which maintain the historic continuity of Christianity the same trends, though weaker, are apparent. Many Anglicans and some Romanists exhibit as much fanatical zeal as any Protestant modernist for human salvation through mundane readjustments. Though the sacraments still are administered the doctrinal lag is portentous. And seemingly little or no effort is being made to discover the nature of modern irreligion and to achieve an adequate doctrinal development to meet it.

V

The present sad state of the Church must grieve all of us, but it need not make us wholly pessimistic. In two earlier periods of history irreligion was equally positive and equally dominant. Yet the scepticism of the Renaissance and the scepticism of the Enlightenment each gave way to a new age of faith. And significantly in each of these cases the religious revival involved a great doctrinal development. If, then, historical analogy has any significance we may reasonably assume that the impact of modern anthropological heresies should produce in the Church a corresponding development in orthodoxy.

But if a revival of religion in this form is imminent it should be possible for Churchmen to hasten its coming by appropriate measures. To do this they must first discover the reason why they themselves need a rededication to God and a renewal of their own Christian activities. Is it not because they too have been infected with the general anthropological heresy which has caused multitudes of former Churchmen to leave the Church, and the world at large to remain unconverted? If this is so we can expect to revive religion in ourselves and others only to the degree in which we can overcome rationally the modernistic form of irreligion.

VI

The actualities of Christian experience can be rationally apprehended on two intellectual levels. The first and the simplest is mere factual recognition, and this can be formulated as an intuitive conviction or dogma. The second is a conscious exploration of all the rational implications of the facts and their relationships with other relevant fields of knowledge. And these results can be expressed only as a system of doctrinal scholarship. Now these two modes of apprehension are not respectively the way in which the ordinary Christian on the one hand, and the professional theologian on the other, apprehend and justify their common religion. On the contrary, every Churchman must deal with his spiritual experiences on the same intellectual level as he does those that are secular. He cannot remain an illiterate peasant as a Christian while he is a high sophisticate in all other matters. And certainly he cannot overcome a fully rationalized religious doubt in himself or in others by a simple affirmation on a lower intellectual level.

Since this is a day of universal education irreligion is not a simple dogma but a fully elaborated doctrine. Every one of us has been indoctrinated in secular schools with materialistic pre-conceptions concerning human nature. Therefore it will not suffice for the Church merely to recognize that man is a spiritual

being and to require acceptance of this truth from church members. The dogma must be rationalized and developed as a doctrinal system. Only thus may religion meet irreligion on its own ground and truly overcome it.

VII

To recover a sense of his own spirituality modern man must deliberately retrace the course by which he has lost it. This has involved a double departure from cultural norms, both of which are inspired by a mistaken devotion to the principles of natural science. The first of these cultural aberrations is the acquisition of an insensitivity toward many phases of human experience. Such an intellectual distortion is always possible. Man is rational only because he can direct his attention where he chooses and for the moment ignore all other matters. If he allowed himself to be conscious of all the sensations that are continually pouring in over his nerves he would never get beyond mere perception. If he allowed his mind to follow every mental association of any single thought he would never get beyond mere reverie. An essential element of rationality is selectiveness and purposive direction. But this voluntary control of the mind has its dangers as well as its advantages. An individual or a generation may become so habituated to a concentration of intellectual interest on certain matters as to lose all awareness of anything else. Now we modern men seem to have undergone such a fixation of mental habit. Because modern science has accomplished great things we have deliberately made our thought exclusively scientific. Since the scientist is simply an observer of physical phenomena he must be objective, impersonal and wholly disinterested. Any awareness of emotional, personal or evaluative reactions within himself he must regard as irrelevant distractions. Accordingly we have disciplined ourselves to ignore the subjective. Yet the greater part of all human experience is made up of subjectivities. The very essence of man is his self-awareness, his personality and his character. Indeed, he can acquire knowledge of the external

world only on the basis of his incommunicable self-consciousness, within the framework of his cumulated personal experiences, and against a scale of æsthetic and moral values. Therefore for him habitually to ignore his subjective sensibilities is arbitrarily to impoverish the data of his rationality. And for him to attenuate his conception of the cosmos to the compass of his preferred awarenesses is no more or less than wishful thinking.

Yet modern man has disciplined himself to accept both of these fallacies. For example, when he reads a novel he is highly critical of the work as a presentation of factual realities. But he is wholly uncritical of its integrity as a work of art in which the author represents pure subjectivities of human experience through the medium of fiction in exactly the same way that another artist might represent them through music. It is no doubt because our age lacks this second critical faculty that it is so easily victimized by books of bombast and sentimentality provided that their setting and plot are sufficiently realistic, timely or sensational. In a similar fashion modern man always invalidates his reading of a novel by a false philosophy which assumes that every emotional state which it portrays must be depersonalized since it can be significant only as the product of objective conditions or as a cause of objective behavior.

Closely related to this preferential selection of the experiential data which modern man allows his mind to contemplate is his second aberration from the norm of culture. This is an arbitrary limitation of his thought to the processes used by science. Since the physical world is substantial, quantitative and uniform, the scientist consolidates its recurrent phenomena into species concepts and formulates general laws which describe their invariable reactions. Accordingly modern man, in his ardor to make all of his thought scientific, disciplines himself to deal with the whole of his experience in the same manner. But the greater part of his life is made up of particular situations and specific reactions. Each human being is much more than a member of his species; by his self-consciousness, his personality and his character he is a unique entity in the universe. His experience cannot be generalized.

Indeed it can be rationally correlated with that of other men only in partial patterns of abstract qualities. Yet modern man has taught himself to regard his most personal and subjective experiences impersonally and objectively. In so doing he dehumanizes not only his behavior but also his intelligence. If, for example, friction develops in his own marriage he attempts to generalize the situation. It is, he says, merely another instance of temperamental incompatibility to be dealt with as such. By his mental habit he is unable to perceive that the very essence of marriage is its potentiality to resolve sacramental harmony from a union of two unique and therefore incompatible personalities.

In meeting the anthropological heresy of our day Churchmen must work on both levels of religion, that of immediate awareness and that of rationalized explanation. Not only by sermons but by every modern means of communication they must endeavor to turn the attention of men and women toward the unique, personal and subjective aspects of all normal human experience. But above all they must set themselves to discover and to expound the processes of rationality by which these experiences are normally comprehended. In other words, they must develop the epistemology and logic of the humanities in the same degree to which the philosophy of science has already been carried. In so doing they will necessarily develop a valid Christian doctrine of anthropology in terms of modern scholarship.

VIII

Of course not every Christian, or even every clergyman, is called to work directly in this new synthesis. In our zeal to revive the doctrinal function of the Church we may not neglect the other functions of sacrament and philanthropy. Many men will continue their present labors as priests, pastors, reformers and administrators. But all must contribute indirectly to the development of a Christian anthropology. They will reaffirm their faith in the spirituality of man until it becomes an intellectual certitude and contagious. They will cease to appease their own secret doubts

by inattention, and will face them honestly and bravely: to formulate a problem is always the first step toward its solution. Moreover, all Churchmen will refuse to allow themselves or others to commit intellectual suicide by retreating to the obscurities called fundamentalism. No one whose faith is sure can doubt that the actualities of the spiritual world are rationally compatible with the realities of the physical universe. Therefore every Churchman must believe that Christian doctrine can be formulated in terms of the best and profoundest scholarship to which we have access. And always despite all other intellectual uncertainties we still may be certain that, as in former periods when irreligion was all but universal, so in our own time of intellectual bewilderment God will raise up men of light and learning who will restore in the Church its ministry of teaching.

RELIGIOUS POETRY AND THE ANGLICAN TRADITION

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Religion is that aspect of man's activity which relates him to God; in religion man deals with the overtones of the common life—especially with the problem of the meaningfulness of the totality of circumstance. Religion differs from philosophy in the treatment of its materials, even though the observable sum of the materials be the same; philosophy is an attempt to describe the materials in the most fundamental aspect with which the intellect can deal, whereas religion represents an effort to discover their significances, in an intelligible perspective, and then to relate the discovery to the common life in a dynamic fashion. Religion, therefore, is primarily life, rather than primarily thought. Religion is in essence direct and immediate experience, a standing before the numinous, the transcendent, rather than a subsequent and cloistered critique of such experience—although the latter is important and has its legitimate place as philosophical or doctrinal theology.

Consequently the two phases of religion are indicated: the mystical-devotional and the doctrinal-intellectual. The former looks toward the vocabulary of art while the latter looks toward the vocabulary of philosophy. This is true only as a general and fundamental tendency, to be sure, since theology quite consciously uses some of the methods and materials of the arts, and the *cultus*, in all its broad ramifications, deals constantly with concepts familiar to the philosopher. Nevertheless—and this is particularly true of Christianity—these two great streams are the warp and woof of that beautiful fabric which is the religious heritage of mankind.

If, then, there are aspects of religion whose faces are turned toward the arts, it is evident that some bond of affinity must exist between religion and (to become specific) poetry. Poetry is a term almost as elusive of definition as is religion. Broadly conceived, it is that type of literature which deals with reality in mythical, symbolical, and rhythmic terms. There are various more specific molds into which poetry is usually cast—the most elemental being that of rhythmic and metred writing. It is the fact of *metre*, of measure, both of idea and form, which is the peculiarity of poetry. Rhythm and measure each presuppose the other, and are hence actually concomitant. Poetry is a reflection of the fundamentally rhythmic character of existence within time and the fundamentally metred character of existence within space. But, having reflected each, it points beyond both, as any dimension is seen to be such only as over against the foil of eternity. This brings poetry to the area of religion.

The deep-lying patterns of poetry being at the point of impingement between time-space and eternity, then, the problem of the transcendent necessarily presents itself. But this is the same transcendent, the same numinous, before which we saw that the life of religion is lived. Therefore poetry and religion stand on the same ground and look up into the same eternal order. They both reach out for significances and perspectives, and both in some sense attempt to relate their findings to the categories of daily human life. Philosophy can afford to think in a cloister, as can, perhaps, pure science, but both religion and art must spring from the problems and aspirations of the life of man in order to be relevant. The perspective of both religion and art must be a perspective on the scene of the human predicament.

Nevertheless, it is a perspective from the vantage-point of transcendence, so to speak. Poetry and religion alike point to the area of ultimate meanings, which experience indicates to be an area of supra-conceptuals of which we cannot speak except in symbol and myth. The descriptive functions of prose and of philosophy are not possible in that area, or there would be no valid distinction of essence between poetry and prose or between

religion and philosophy. Description, to be differentiated from symbolic representation, must be exact, accurate, presentative rather than representative. Both poetry and religion deal with material of a transcendent, supra-conceptual and supra-verbal character, which can be spoken of only with conscious inaccuracy, in the language of symbol.

The use of symbol pointing to an area of transcendence is the final tie between poetry and religion. Poetry too is life, rather than formal intellectual dialectic. It involves conscious experience, usually with a definite emotional content. Wordsworth's definition of poetry as "emotion recollected in tranquility" indicates that the structure of poetic experience and its subsequent intellectualization is distinctly analogous to the mystical-doctrinal transition in religion.

Furthermore the human ingredients with which both deal are ultimately reducible to the same categories: the relation of the individual to the overworld and the relation between souls within the structures of human society. The stuff of the one is the stuff of the other—not in any complete sense, perhaps, but in the sense of common aspirations (often unconscious to literature, often garbled to religion), common methods, and, above all, a common language.

The common language of poetry and religion—myth and symbol—is nowhere so apparent as in liturgy. Liturgy is, in its deepest essence, an act of praise and proclamation. Now the hymn is likewise a vehicle of praise and proclamation, and is hence a binding tie between liturgy and poetry of the purely literary type. This hymnodic principle is essential to liturgy, and is essential to poetry that can be called specifically religious. Poetry in the Church necessarily reflects the liturgical attitude and principle. The mystical element underlying both religion and poetry of a religious trend normally expresses itself in praise, which is, of course, addressed to the Eternal. As this element becomes more completely rationalized (*cf.* the transition toward formal doctrine in theology) it may take the form of proclama-

tion, and become a statement *about* the experience, addressed to men.

It is evident from all this that a certain factor of personal experience, with a definite emotional content, underlies both religion and poetry. This experience we might with essential accuracy term mystical, in the broad sense. Without raising the problem of religious experience, which is in itself a broad and important subject, we might simply accept the obvious fact that there is that experience, and, without advancing detailed arguments as to its subjectivity or objectivity, assume for it at least an empirical and functional validity.

Of all the groups within Christendom, the Anglican Church has exhibited, perhaps, the most pronounced evidence of a deep literary consciousness. The heavy emphasis laid upon the Word in the reformational Anglican formularies may indeed be a classic manifestation of this. The peculiar place of the English nation in the history of poetry is a factor to be interrelated with this emphasis of the national religion; in fact, of all the nations of the modern world, England offers the most brilliant poetry. English poetry is rivalled only by that of classic Greece.

The Book of Common Prayer represents, in perhaps its best form, the wedding of religion and literature in the English heritage. Together with the Authorized Version of the Bible, the Prayer Book is the norm of pure English style, and to it the English rhetorician looks. That its superb beauty is entirely a matter of literary style may well be questioned; that it surges forth from deep religious feeling is entirely more probable. In the conjunction of the two lies the power of that great reformational literary-religious monument.

Outside of liturgy, then, which is by its very nature less flexible, perhaps the best index to the character of religious life of a given Communion is its religious poetry. Poetry and liturgy have in common the fact that they are reactions to an identical experience: man standing on the frontier of the realm of the spirit, and grasping fragments of Eternity. Religious poetry and Church liturgy rise out of the same ultimate category. Both make use of deeply

rhythmic relationships, and are therefore seen to be based upon alternate tension and relaxation. These alternate tensions are one of the basic interpolations of time-space in religious processes, as in God there can be no rhythm, for in the Eternal there is no mutation. Even in this fundamentally temporal aspect, however, a genuine unity underlies the alternations of rhythm, and the entire situation reveals the fact of experience of final unity (the eternal order) which is translated into the time space order of relationships through the device of rhythm. It is this which makes poetry closer to religion than is, say, physics.

A study of the principles behind the great historic liturgies of Christendom reveals patterns of tension, relaxation, and climax; a study of mystical or ascetical theology divulges similar patterns. In poetry, of course, they are much more explicit.¹ Poetry and belief are likewise intimately related, for poetry is highly conditioned by inner attitudes, being essentially impressionistic in method.

The spiritual life of the Church of England since the Reformation has been cast into some general types, as shown in its poetry. The first type is the religious poetry of the Reformation period, dominated by Calvinism and Platonism. In the second period, the Seventeenth Century, the poetry was strongly tinged with Arminian theology, Catholic metaphorical style, aestheticism, traditionalism, and, to a much smaller extent, the prophetic values of Puritanism. The Eighteenth Century was marked in its early period by rationalism and a meagre spirituality; in its later period it witnessed the great Evangelical revival, and the cult of sensibility. This sensibility grew up into Romanticism. The Romantic Movement, lasting approximately from 1790 until 1833, began with the humanistic and libertarian philosophy of the French Revolution, but through its increasing interest in the past, and especially in medievalism, became rather traditional-minded in its latter days. Out of this rose the Oxford Movement, which had its roots in the Gothic and other romantic literature of the era

¹ Except in *vers libre*, in which rhythmic patterns are quite subtle.

just preceding. The Broad Church Movement appeared shortly afterward, and probably served as a more fertile ground for the growth of Victorianism. The Victorian age was characterized by a type of religion which tended to optimism, moralism, and a faith in social progress. The World War of 1914-1918 put a violent end to this tendency—or at least amputated it—and out of the resulting chaos and despair came a movement back toward a strong supernatural type of religion, more or less authoritarian in emphasis, and reaffirming certain traditional values.

There runs a single thread through all this: Anglican religious thought is bi-polar. On this hand it is Catholic, on the other hand it is Protestant, and so on. Anglicanism has usually run in at least two channels at the same time; yet never in unrelated channels, for Anglicanism has a unity more basic (and more subtle) than that of Roman Catholicism.

Anglican thought in the Twentieth Century, in the contemporary period, evidences important spiritual trends. The traditional alliance between theology and literature in Anglicanism has been maintained. The Twentieth Century has been an age of ideologies—and of mythologies; and this gives literature a peculiar relevance and an enhanced dignity. The rapid growth of periodical literature during the past century has made the printed page one of the most potent allies of modern organized Christianity. The myth of Science is the most widespread cultural error with which the Church has to deal; modern unbelief and secularism excuse themselves on the basis of being "scientific," just as their Eighteenth Century counterparts proudly styled themselves "rational." The outworn scientific viewpoints of the later Victorian period dominate the thought of the man in the street; the scientists themselves are generally likely to be less dogmatic on philosophical and religious points.

Secularism, though certainly not unknown in any age, seems to have become more coherent, better organized, and more articulate in the present century. The fundamental dichotomy between the Church and the world, between the community of believers and the community of unbelief (however rationalized or disguised),

has been brought into sharper outline. The most definite example of this is the conflict between Marxist communism and the Orthodox Church in Russia, but what is explicit there is somewhat more implicit elsewhere. Much of this is a by-product of social transitions, and is only rarely a simple anticlericalism.

The Twentieth Century, age of the myth of Science and a dozen different "ideologies," is an age of coexistent incompatibles. The Anglican Church, with its Catholic and Modernist parties, has its own coexistent incompatibles. The Twentieth Century, both inside and outside the Church, is a riddle not yet solved.

But as the century progresses, whatever religious experience there is will eventually be cast into song, and through this song some future generation will come to know the inner recesses of our faith.

LAW AND RELIGION IN THE ANCIENT WORLD AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE BIBLE

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It is only within a lifetime that the learned world has come to learn *in extenso* of law in the ancient world. Historians of the subject had concerned themselves with the constitutions of the fitful Greek democracies, more especially with the idealistic programmes of Socrates, Plato, and similar philosophers, but in particular with the Roman law and its far-reaching results in State and Church down to the present day. For the more ancient world there was the 'Mosaic Law' of the Jews. But this in the religious tradition was regarded as a unique revelation, not to be aligned with other similar but purely human developments. And even in Protestantism, especially that of the Lutheran type, while 'Grace' came to be contrasted with 'Law,' with corresponding depreciation of the latter element, nevertheless the Torah remained part of the universal Christian Bible, as integral to the divine revelation, however the conflict with 'Grace' might be worked out.

But modern Oriental archaeology has vastly expanded the panorama of ancient law, and scholarship is demonstrating the part it served in the creation of that society. The Code of Hammurabi, the Hittite Code, have presented to us formal bodies of law, in face of which the Biblical shrink to small proportion, while they are also junior in age. The thousands of legal tablets unearthed in the regions where the Babylonian cuneiform held sway illuminate the case-law of those large territories for three to four millennia. The Biblical law and its practice are no longer prime in importance, for they are now illuminated by all this fresh and abundant material, with its revelation of the extent of law in the ancient world; indeed we are learning, despite the current inherited tradition of Israel's isolation, how closely integrated Israel was in

that extended and long-enduring Oriental civilization. Indeed much of so-called 'Pentateuchal Criticism' with its persistent down-datings breaks down in view of the hoary tradition now revealed as lying back of the 'Mosaic' laws.¹

On the other hand the Israelite notion and development of law still possess their abiding interest, and can serve *in parvo*, with the one-volume Bible, as typical of the process of the history of ancient law. And this field, narrow as it looks comparatively to-day, has its abiding interest in that it portrays the development and functioning of law in a consecutive political history of a millennium and a half, as presented in the Hebrew Canon, the Apocrypha (part of the Christian Bible), and the New Testament. Also, in distinction from imperial codes and the mass of dry legal documents, which often only a lawyer may analyze, we have in the Bible the drama of law in story and history and the outpourings of Prophets and Psalmists and Wise men. To this is to be added the long prospect of a more particular law of a Church-State in Judaism culminating in the Talmud, while within the New Testament we have the beginnings of that Canon Law which was to play such a large part in subsequent Christian history, for the law of our civilization goes back in part to that Oriental basis, as well as to Greece and Rome.

But as over against the older ecclesiastical and pious tradition the field of Israelite law is lightly sidetracked by many to-day in view of its alleged comparative insignificance, both historically and religiously. Bible students, professors and all, are accustomed to pass over it in favor of the more congenial fields of

¹ The writer may concern himself only with the Israelite field, since the ramifications of the subject are too vast, except for legal experts who can handle the original sources, Egyptian, Babylonian, Hittite. He expresses his obligations to a series of discussions held in the past year by the Oriental Group of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania, and in particular to a participant in it, Herbert Liebesny, Doctor of Laws (Vienna), who is working under a grant from the American Philosophical Society in the study of legal procedure in the Babylonian Nuzi documents. He presented the group with a select bibliography of nearly 60 titles. The origins of, say, the Roman law are obscure indeed in comparison with what we now know of ancient Oriental law.

Prophecy and Psalter. The older Protestantism fully recognized the part of religion, and the Protestant established Churches had at once to formulate their canons of government and also to co-operate with the political establishment in agreement for a common law for the nation. Modern 'Liberalism' has emancipated itself from this notion of the fundamental relation between law and religion; as in State it makes much of the Bill of Rights and ignores the duties laid down in the Constitution, so in religion it follows a false bypath of Evangelicalism by its depreciation of the element of law in the Biblical tradition, which is authoritative for the Christian Church as well as for Judaism. The result is that the current Pulpit gives us pictures of Preachers preaching largely in the wilderness, with ignoring of the process by which the immortal instinct of the right, through the judgments of Judges and Kings and Priests, of Magistrates and Elders and Rabbis, of Apostles and Presbyters, came to be incorporated in the life of the society concerned. For a body politic must precipitate in outward form the instinct of the law binding its life.

The unique value of the Biblical tradition of law lies in its primary definition of its One God as the final Judge in all cases—a legalistic enough attribution for modern sensibilities, but enduring from the beginning to the end of the Bible, and absolutely true to human fears and hopes. It is not accidental but typical that Sarah in her dispute with Abraham over the hand-maid concubine Hagar cries out, "Yahweh judge between me and thee!" with entire legal right in her claim, as the husband recognized (Gen. 16: 3 ff.—an early case of assertion of a wife's rights!). The same patriarch has his contention with the Deity over the threatened destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. 18: 25—the same divine title in Ps. 94: 2). Here we have in incipience that long 'contention' with God, which marks the great books of the Bible, the Book in which man argues with God. So Jeremiah: "Thou art righteous, Yahweh, that so I plead with Thee, argue with Thee" (Jer. 12: 1—these two verbs legalistic terms). The Psalter has as frequent subject the saint's argument with God—"why does the wicked

prosper?"² On this subject the book of Job is classical, lamenting as it does not the evil between enemies, but the suffering of the righteous man which comes from God: "There is no umpire between us, who might lay his hand upon us both" (*habeas corpus!*). It is a case of God *versus* God: "Mine eye poureth out tears unto God, that He would support the right (legal phrase) with God." (Job 9: 33; 16: 20 ff.) Hebrew thought had to face the problem involved in the dogma that God is Judge of all the world, the chief *crux* of all monotheism, a more primary one in society than that whether He is Father. Satan appears in the same book as chief prosecutor, to "try out the hearts and reins," lifting the cause indeed above strict legal conditions. Finally Satan becomes the impersonation of all moral evil, whose power is to be broken only at the last assize (Rev. 20). The belief in the Justice of Deity had to be maintained, even if the dogma of His All-Sovereignty was impaired.

The ancient Pagan religions equally centred the origin and control of justice and law in the heavens. But they departmentalized the function—somewhat as in our modern constitutional governments. In Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Hittite land the Sun-God (Re, Shemesh) was the deity of justice, with beautiful appropriateness. But this isolation of judicial authority left the other gods out of jurisdiction, and so the *Wirr-warr* of moral order in the world presented no problem as in monotheistic Israel. The Greek mythology exhibits this Pagan pattern *in extenso*. The philosophic came to invent a personification of justice in the goddess Diké, followed by the Romans with Justitia. The ancient gods were not equal to the task.³

To return to Israel's history, the sense of right and wrong (like that of 'doing things the right or the wrong way') may well be

² This universal problem appears equally in similar Egyptian literature, as in "The Prayers of One Unjustly Persecuted" (A. Erman, *Lit. of the Anc. Egyptians*, 302 ff.).

³ Diké, 'justice,' comes from the verb *deiknumi*, 'to point out, direct,' and so is parallel to *Torah*, from root *yarah*, of the same meaning—a remarkable coincidence, not I think recognized.

described by the cryptic term 'instinct,' a word used by biological scientists without explanation of its mystery. We apply to it the word 'conscience,' taken from the Latin, and equivalent to the Greek *suneidesis*, with its Hebrew predecessor expressed personally by the general verb 'to know,' e.g. Ps. 51:3 (5): "I know my transgression, and (even as) my sin is not hid from Thee." But this sense of conscience arose out of the age-long communal experience of rights and wrongs affecting society, in the Semitic world as elsewhere, in the progressive hierarchy of family, clan, tribe, nation, empire, church. This origin of conscience out of the law binding the society in question appears in the history of the Hebrew terms. It should be *de trop* to note that *sèdeq*, translated with 'righteousness' in all versions, means primarily the legal 'right,' quite correspondent with German 'Recht.' The causative verbal stem of the same root has been invariably rendered with *dikaion*, *justificare*, 'to justify,' i.e. as understood, 'to make righteous.' But the Hebrew verb means 'to give one his right,' 'to acquit,' with the charge not proven, or dismissed; it is primarily no declaration of moral righteousness. The general misunderstanding of 'justification' in the New Testament and commonly understood Christian theology is unfortunately most erroneous. The divine Judge in such action is exercising the plenary power of pardon—the condemnation no longer holds, the case is dismissed—a power not only a perquisite to royalty in all history of law, but granted to the Chief Executive of democratic states, like the President of the United States and the Governors of the several Commonwealths of the Union.

Similarly the word often rendered with 'justice' (*mišpāt*) does not express the abstract idea of that virtue; it is first of all the finding of the judge (*šōpēt*) in the case in question, and this sense appears in the earliest use of the word, in the so-called Elohistic Code of law, Ex. 21-23, which is entitled the *mišpāṭim*, again mistranslated 'ordinances,' as though effected by legislation. But these 'court-decisions' are instances of case-law, common law, in which the past findings of courts have come to be normative for subsequent legal action, as so peculiarly in the history of English

and American law. The Hebrew legal tradition reports Moses' decision in the case of the claim of Zelophehad's daughters to their father's estate (Num. 27: 1 ff.). "And Moses brought their case (*mišpat*) before Yahweh," who gave decision for the daughters (an early instance of the establishment of women's rights in a field that English law was very slow in recognizing). And so the decision "became a statute (*ḥōq*) of decision (*mišpat*) for Israel"; i.e. the decision had force of statutory law. In 2 Sam. 30: 21 ff. is given the story of a similar decision by David, with the same legal terms, which became a precedent, "a statute and decision unto this day." The Elohistic Code, which we have been considering, has its exact parallel in the Code of Hammurabi (18th century B.C.), with similar legal formulation. Both codes are *corpora* of past court decisions, which have become currently authoritative.* Similarly the word translated 'equity' (*mišōr*), often in conjunction with *sēdeq* (e.g. Is. 11: 4) is primarily legalistic; the same combination occurs in a Ugaritic text (from Syria, of the 15th century B.C.) for the relation of a wife to her husband, 'her right and her equity' (Virolleaud, *Keret*, 1936, line 12), and also in Babylonian law with the terms *kettu* and *mēšaru*. If there is more than mere parallelism here, one thinks of the contrasted meanings of law and equity in English and American law, bewildering to lawyers as well as to layman.⁵

The Pentateuchal codes are all equally attributed to Moses, a member of the priestly tribe of Levi. However he never appears in sacerdotal function, which charge is in his brother Aaron's hands. But he is the illuminate of Deity, by divine election, and as lawgiver of such authority he is illustrated by Hammurabi's declaration in the introduction to his code: "When Marduk sent me to rule men and to promulgate righteousness, I put justice and righteousness into the law of the land, and promoted the welfare of the people."

* For such legal *corpora* of later ages reference may be made to the most useful volume by J. M. Zane, *The Story of Law* (1927), especially cc. 9-12 on the developments of such codes from Rome down into early English law.

⁵ Cf. Zane, ch. 13, on 'English Law—Righteous and Unrighteous,' presenting the long conflict between common law and equity.

Whatever may be the truth in the Mosaic attribution for these codes, some of the materials, like the judge-made law in the Elohistic Code, must be early, for there is no reference to any higher source of authority.⁶ Moses as leader is followed by a military layman, Joshua. Then there is the fitful history of the Judges, which title (used also of Phoenician city-magistrates) indicates the ideal cherished for these temporary dictators, which indeed none of them fulfilled, so far as we know. We may compare the popular title of the President of the United States as Chief Magistrate, although he possesses no judicial powers. The later comment from the monarchical period was valid: "In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did what was right in his own eyes" (Jud. 17:6; 21:25). A reaction from this anarchy, furthered by the Philistine tyranny, appears in the last of the Judges, Samuel. Unlike his predecessors, he is connected as priest (although not a Levite) with the shrine at Shiloh, where lay the ancient ark. He functioned as priest, replacing a certain Eli and his family, and served as judge in the proper sense of the word according to one anecdote: "Samuel judged Israel all the days of his life. And he went from year to year in circuit (n. b. the legal term) to Bethel and Gilgal, And his return was to Ramah, for there was his house, and there he judged Israel" (1 Sam. 7:15 ff.). The record makes of Samuel also 'a prophet of Yahweh' (3:20 f.), just as the same title came to be attributed to Moses as the first and greatest of the order (Dt. 34:10). Here again we have a figure who should have ideally personified the identity of religion and law. But Samuel with human weakness attempted to establish a family succession to his dictatorship. "When he was old, he made his sons judges over Israel"; these, Joel and Abijah, "were judges in Beer-sheba. And his sons walked not in his ways, but turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted justice" (8:1 ff.). A true story of a frequent aspect of alleged 'justice' in history!

⁶ If pure legend, the tradition has its parallels in similar attributions in the ancient world, e.g. in Sparta to Lycurgus, in Rome to Numa Pompilius. A society came to self-consciousness through its law, and sanctified the lawgiver.

There follows the troubled history of the rise of the monarchy. The loose confederation of tribes was breaking up through inner anarchy and under the blows of the Philistines. Judge and prophet and priest did not suffice; such leaders were accidental. The people demanded a king, one who "will judge us, and fight our battles" (ch. 8). Samuel condemns their request. But divine revelation contradicts Samuel, who is bidden to anoint Saul as king, which he proceeds to do, and the divine choice is further approved by Saul being seized with a spell of 'prophetic' enthusiasm (cc. 9, 10). The added note (10: 25) that "Samuel spoke to the people the *mišpāt* of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it before Yahweh," however secondary, is of interest; the Hebrew word means here not 'custom' with the English versions, but 'judicial administration,' and so more correctly the Vulgate, 'legem regni,' and the German version, 'alle Rechte des Königsreichs.'

Saul was an unfortunate choice, a mere soldier, not a possible judge of the people. Also of orderly administration on the part of his brilliant successor David we learn almost nothing. There is only the brief statement how "he executed justice and right for all his people," along with a list of his cabinet (2 Sam. 8: 15 ff.).

David's son Solomon is very much a Louis XIV in historical retrospect and romance, e.g. Proverbs and the Song of Songs. But he for the first time attempted an ordered administration of his government, however ill it succeeded, with the dissatisfaction of the people under their burdens of service and taxes, with the subsequent schism of North and South. However he is pictured as a king of ideal purpose for his chief function as monarch, the administration of justice. Upon his accession, in conjunction with the great sacrifices at Gibeon, Yahweh appears to him (1 Ki. 3), even as He had once favored Samuel. In response to the divine inquiry, "Ask what I shall give thee," the young king responds: "Give Thy servant an attentive heart (i.e. intelligence) to judge Thy people, so as to distinguish between good and evil. For who is able to judge this Thy so weighty people?" The

word translated 'attentive' (the English Bible, 'understanding') is in the Hebrew 'hearing,' i.e. attentive to the evidence. Further down occurs the evident legal phrase, 'to hear justice' (v. 11). The divine response congratulates him, and announces: "I have given thee a wise and attentive heart." That is, Solomon's desired wisdom was primarily that for administering justice, and such is the primary meaning of the same root in Arabic (*hkm*). We may again compare Hammurabi's declaration of his inspiration for the same royal duty. This request of Solomon for judicial wisdom is immediately illustrated in the following story (vv. 16 ff.) of his decision as between two harlots over a baby. The king, as fount of justice, was accessible to the meanest of his people. A similar story of a woman's direct appeal to the king appears in 2 Ki. 8: 1 ff. Solomon's wisdom as a philosopher, a collector of proverbs and riddles (1 Ki. 5: 9 ff.; EVV, 4: 22 ff.) was that of a connoisseur; but the above anecdote presents him in his prime official duty and capacity.

For the subsequent history of the actual administration of law and justice in the two Kingdoms until the Josianic reformation we have the constant condemnatory witness of the Prophets. Queen Jezebel's malversion of justice in the case of Naboth and his vineyard is a case in point (1 Ki. 21). Here the jury which acted in the premises were "the elders and gentry in his city, fellow-citizens with Naboth" (v. 8), a proceeding that exhibits the current communal administration of justice. But a jury is no voucher of justice, as the history of English and American law shows. The Prophets contrast with such depraved administration of justice ideals that many great lawyers since have attempted to phrase: Hos. 8: 12: "Though I write for him (Ephraim—n. b. written laws) a myriad (items) of My law, they are accounted as something alien;" Mic. 6: 8: "It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what Yahweh doth require of thee: Only to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God."

The book of Chronicles—the veracity of many of its historical statements is now coming to be recognized—tells of king Jehoshaphat's attempt at judicial reorganization, 2 Ch. 19: 4-11, a

passage which has its parallels in the history of reformation of practice of the law through subsequent ages, and which deserves to be read at length. "He set judges in the land . . . city by city. And he said to the judges: Consider what ye do; for ye judge not for men but for Yahweh. . . . There is no iniquity with Yahweh our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of bribes." Also he established a superior court in Jerusalem, composed of "the Levites and the priests and the heads of the hereditary families (Heb., 'fathers' houses')," i.e. the last named a secular element, with which may be compared the English landed gentry. The court is presided over by the chief priest Amariah, and with him is associated "Zebediah ben Ishmael, officer of the house of Israel in all the royal affairs"—i.e. a distinction was made for rights of the king, with which compare all subsequent monarchical law. For such a graded judiciary legal tradition gives a precedent from Moses' day in a story in Ex. 18. Moses is pictured as "sitting to judge the people from morning to evening." His father-in-law Jethro, an Arab, who is visiting him, inquires, Why all this business? He replies: "I judge between a man and his neighbor, and I make them know Yahweh's statutes and laws (*tōrōth*)."¹ Jethro advises him that so he will surely "wear himself out"; he must appoint judges for the thousands, the hundreds, the fifties, the tens (communal designations, cf. the English 'hundred'), and "great matters they shall bring to thee,"—advice which Moses followed.

The ideal of a king is beautifully expressed in the 72d Psalm, doubtless a Coronation Ode, by some Poet Laureate: "Give the king Thy judgments, O God, and Thy right unto the king's son, that he may judge Thy people with right, and Thy poor with justice . . . that he may judge the poor of the land, and save the children of the needy, and crush the oppressor." But such perfection could be incarnated only in the ideal person of the Messiah; Is. 6: 3 ff.: "He shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither decide after the hearing of his ears; but with righteousness shall he judge the poor, and decide with equity for the humble of the land." The utterance is a sigh over the present, a bright hope for

the future, understandable to those who know of the perplexities and perversities of the law, in republics as well as in monarchies. We mark in Israel's history the same condition as in all societies. Law, however sacred in origin and purpose, is not self-protective. It may be the will of God—or of Tyrant—or of the Demos. Its practical morality depends upon its execution.

If the 'Book found' in the temple in king Josiah's day (2 Ki. 22, 23) was actually the core of the present book of Deuteronomy (as the present writer holds), it possessed its authority through its claim of Mosaic origin, like the earlier codes. While it was the priest Hilkiah who discovered it, he ranks in the subsequent story as but one of the royal commission of inquiry, and for further corroboration this commission inquires of a woman, an otherwise unknown prophetess, Huldah. There follows the story of the earliest known adoption by king and people of what in modern language is called a constitution. The king assembled all the people of Jerusalem and Judah, with the priests and the prophets, "and he made a covenant before Yahweh . . . to ratify the words of the covenant written in this book." And the people affirm the action: "They took stand to the covenant" (again doubtless a legal phrase).

The more secular part of this Law begins at 16: 18 (introducing a fresh lection-reading entitled 'Judges'): "Judges and Clerks⁷ shalt thou set for thee in all thy gates . . . tribe by tribe. . . . They shall judge the people with judgment of right. . . . Right, right shalt thou follow." In certain cases the 'elders (senators) of the city' met as jury and court (19: 12; 21: 20; 25: 8).

Most remarkable, and unique for millennia, is the provision that the king himself was under this Law—with no legal subterfuge that "the king can do no wrong"! According to 17: 8 ff. the king shall have a copy made of "this Law, and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life . . . that his

⁷ The word generally translated 'officers' means 'inscribers,' and doubtless refers to the secretaries of the court; i.e. written documents were to be used.

heart be not lifted up above his brothers"—as we would say, above his fellow-men.

Josiah was a King Arthur. He met his death on the field of battle, defending his nation against an invader. Within a few decades of the ratification of the Book of the Covenant Judah was subjugated by Babylon, Jerusalem and its temple were destroyed. The Book of the Law survived as the one concrete heritage of the past. With accumulations of other still more ancient codes and of historical documents bearing upon the origins of the People of Israel, the Torah became the centre of the legal and social life of the Jews. Their constitution became now that of a Church-State, and its history is in contrast with the politics of modern nations. (A legalistic exception survives in the 'Civitas Romana.') There was the attempt at a hierarchical organization in the hereditary high-priesthood, this followed by the Hasmonæan *régime*, continued by the nominal monarchy of the Herods under the dominion of Rome, concluding with a popularistic rebellion against the Empire, which ended in the destruction of the People as a Nation.

But the Book survived, like the English Magna Charta, as the Roman Twelve Tables did not, except in fragmentary citations. It became more and more the spiritual centre of Judaism. With the destruction of the temple and the evacuation of the priesthood its interpretation and application came into the hands of the 'teachers of the law,' *nomodidaskaloi*, 'lawyers,' as the English Bible properly translates, in the old-fashioned sense of the word. The subsequent development incorporated in the legal corpus of the Talmud may only be noticed, as bearing exclusively upon a church-folk. A partial parallel may be found in Christendom with the breakdown of the Empire, when the old Roman law combined with the Christian canon law became the organizing and centralizing element of the fragments of the Empire. The last great emperor, Justinian, created his code, which was to be the rule of European society for ages. And in that sphere we find the lawyers, mostly clerics, as almost the sole scholars of those

ages, playing their part in the preservation and elaboration of the law, even as did the rabbis for the Jewish law.

The Church in Jerusalem began as a communistic society; "they had all things in common" (Acts 2: 44 ff.), a condition that could not healthily continue. The indolent and riff-raff naturally came into such a community, with the result of sharp retorts in early authoritative documents: "If any will not work, neither let him eat. For we hear of some that walk among you disorderly, that work not at all, but are busybodies. Now them that are such we command to exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ that with quietness they learn to eat their own bread" (2 Thess. 3: 10 ff.). The pauper-problem was indeed one of the first to be met by the young Church. Its general *morale* followed that of Judaism, without the latter's legalism. The moral precepts abounding at the conclusion of the Epistles are those of personal, 'apostolic' authority, are not law. The one corporate action of the early Church is that reported in Acts 15 on the subject of the mission to the Gentiles, with the issuance of an encyclical letter in the name of 'the apostles and elders and the whole Church.' Towards 'the powers that be' there was no antagonistic nihilism. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's" was the note of the relation to the Empire, which actually protected the new sect. For anything like serious inner organization we must go to the Post-Apostolic period, when the growth of the Churches into practical corporations required law for their well-being and their defense against a hostile world. Alongside of the lauded Christian piety due credit must be given to the development of such an internal legal organization; this it was that preserved the Church during the days of persecution, and enabled it to fit in, hand in glove, with the Empire and its law, when the world turned Christian. And the Christian contribution to that law has its roots in the law and practice of the Bible.

Lord Macmillan in his *Law and Other Things* (1937) speaks (p. 56) of "the mysterious word 'ought'." Modern lawyers do not instruct the laymen enough in the mystery of right and wrong in the abstract, of their definition in the concrete, as did the great

jurists of the past. Macmillan cites Richard Hooker (p. 75): "Law—her seat is in the bosom of God; her voice is the harmony of the world." This authority is preceded by Psalm 19: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork. . . . The law of Yahweh is perfect, restoring the soul."⁸ Human law is the attempt, as the ancients recognized, to express the divine verities in the concrete. Browning makes his *Saul* say (stanza xvii) : "All's love, yet all's law," which sums up Bible doctrine, with all the involved antithesis.

⁸ It is of interest that the use of the word 'law' in the sciences comes from the social term. Men learned of order first in the social world, only secondarily in the physical world. Our use comes from the Latin *lex*, as in "lex metri," and Ovid's line, "qua sidera lege mearent."

Church Congress Syllabus No. 6

PART III

THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN ACTION TODAY *

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The story of the English Church in action today is only one chapter in the story of a great revival within that Church. During the last one hundred years The Church of England has moved toward recovering for itself spheres of life from which its influence has long been absent. So steady and so consistent has been the revival of interest in the social task of Christianity that it is difficult to avoid the hope that it "is on its way to a great fruition."

I

There was one hundred years ago no social philosophy in the English Church. With the exception of a few great individuals there was not the slightest concern with the problems of society. The Church revealed an almost complete lack of awareness of the tremendous changes taking place in the industrial and economic life of England. It was "frigidly decorous" and "spiritually bankrupt." It was "leaderless, obstinate, headlong, wilful, denying, ignorant in the old Chartist days." So decadent was the Church that it was incapable of recognizing that the ideals of the Owenites and Chartists should in many instances have been its own. The Chartists violently accused the clergy of catering to the rich, of revealing no Christian virtues in their lives, and of blocking every attempt at reform. The Chartists did not con-

* Space has prevented the writer from mentioning many names and groups of importance. His purpose has been to set forth in broad lines the social development of the English Church, so that others may be led to an interest in it.

sider the clergy as indifferent to the social struggle, but rather as the deliberate opponents of justice and liberty.

It was this tragic attitude of the Church which led to the loss of so many workingmen to Christianity, and it helped to bring about the state where criticism of the existing economic conditions became identified with hostility to religion. If it is true that the major interest of most men is the earning of their daily bread and the supplying of their basic needs, it becomes clear that a church which does not concern itself with these physical needs will either be hated by, or irrelevant to, the ordinary man. This tragic attitude meant that the Church of England was not fitted to lead the way through the enormous changes that lay ahead. It meant, as it always does, that, where Christianity lost control, idolatry crept in this case an individualism and a desire for gain uncontrolled by the Christian moral tradition. It is becoming obvious to an increasing number of Christians today that if anything is secular, everything is secular, and that Christ is the Lord of Life, the revelation of the Truth about God and Man with authority over every corner of human existence; but, in the words of Temple, a hundred years ago the concern of men like Kingsley and Maurice with economic problems seemed to be, "a novel intrusion of an alien element into the spiritual concerns of the Christian religion." There was no leadership for society, no Christian public opinion within the Church as a whole one hundred years ago.

II

When one views, however, the English Church today the picture is a different one. It is not too much to say that the present social concern of a large minority of the English Church is one of the brightest and most hopeful factors in contemporary Christianity. Nor is this social concern, as some has been, a transient thing which we may expect to succumb to the chaos and disillusionment of the present day. It is, on the contrary, the result of the theological revival of the 19th and 20th centuries, and not, as has often been the case in our own country, a compensation for the loss of a theological foundation. The English Church has not

interested itself in the social affairs of the present merely because, in the words of Charles Gore, "the social problem is the dominant problem of our time," nor because, dubious about its theology, it might concern itself in practical things, but because from within on the basis of its theology it has gone a long way toward recovering its social teachings. This means that the social concern of the group met at Malvern, for example, will have a staying power not possessed by those who have built on other foundations. It is the will of God and not a philosophy of success which supports them. It has meant also that this group within the Church of England has not been satisfied with ambulance work, and has been for the most part wisely sceptical about the secular assumptions of other social philosophies. It has spent a great deal of its time in pointing out the ends for which society and its functions exist, and in thinking out "the idea of a Christian Society." In other words, it is maintaining its unique contribution by basing its social theory on Christian theology, and, by keeping in mind the social problem as a whole, it is attempting to lead the way into the society of the future.

The social concern of the English Church as revealed in the Malvern Declaration, the Anglo-Catholic Summer School of Sociology, or the Lambeth encyclicals has two great foundations, both of which are invaluable for a knowledge of the present. The first is the Christian Socialism of Maurice, Kingsley, Ludlow and their group, and the second the revival of Catholic theology in the Oxford Movement with the social implications of that theology.

1. It was Maurice who may be counted as the beginner of the modern social concern of the English Church. Since the beginning of his "Christian Socialism" in 1848 the voice of social concern has never been silent in the Church, and from that first spring there has flowed an ever-widening stream of social thought. His was a religious movement, and it received its inspiration from, and had its center in, the Bible classes conducted by Maurice himself. He looked upon himself, not as the builder of some elaborate super-structure, but as the "digger" of a foundation. His

chief concern and great contribution were the theological revival which he began. The foundation stone of his thought is what he called the "theocratic principle" and in which he insisted that the first thing to do was to consider the will of God in all affairs, individual or social. It was he who first claimed in the nineteenth century that the task of the Church lay, not only with the individual, but with society. In contrast to the evangelical Christianity of his time he turned his attention, not so much toward the needs and salvation of the believer as toward "the entire revealed will of Him who created man." In this he was God-centred, while it is possible to maintain that the individualistic evangelical faith of his day was man-centred. Maurice built his social theory in the light of the Incarnation, and in the light of God's revelation of Himself he began to see God's plan for man. He dug, not just to reveal what ought to be, but to reveal what is the truth about man's relationship to God and man. "When people told him that competition was the law of the Universe, he replied not that it was an evil law which must be remedied, but that the statement was a lie." He who attempts to build a society on the law of competition is as foolish as the carpenter who builds contrary to the laws of nature. It was coöperation, and not competition which in industry had a Christian foundation, and any scheme of social reconstruction must fail unless it first dug to discover God's will and method.

This early movement was, of course, very small, but it is important in that through the experimental coöperatives, through the resulting contact with the trade unions, and through the Working-Men's College, the Church began to move again into areas of society from which it had long been absent. It was Maurice and his group of Christian Socialists who began to explore the meaning of the sentence, "The earth is the Lord's, and all that therein is."

2. The second foundation for the present social action of the English Church is the revival of Catholic theology in the Oxford Movement. With Maurice this movement saw that Christianity must dominate all of human life, that is was not something to be had in a corner. It is true, of course, that the Oxford Movement

did not begin with a blaze of social concern, but this seems to be due to the fact that these first generation Tractarians had another full-time battle on their hands, that of fighting for their survival as a group against the prejudices that surrounded them. One might say that they were restoring and sharpening a knife with which second generation Tractarians were to do the cutting. It was the contribution of the first generation, as Maurice Reckitt points out, to assert with all its power the primacy of the spiritual; to restore the conception of the Church as an organic body as over against the individualism of the Evangelicals; to declare war upon the liberal, secularizing tendency of the day; to assert that the Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic is not a mere appendage to the state, but a divine institution whose task is to save mankind and be the instrument of God's will. These men, one hundred years ago, were beginning to see the results of secular thought, and forged an instrument to combat it. It has been this instrument which has kept the Christian Social Movement of England from becoming secular and from losing its unique contribution. As the implications of the Movement became more clear the famous generation of slum priests arose, and the Church of England began to discard her alliance with the upper classes, and to regain her long-lost initiative. It would be wrong to give the impression that the Church as a whole was awake at the time of the slum priests, or even that the slum priests saw the problem as a whole and were fiercely critical of the economic system. It takes a long time for an invalid to recover, a long time for an unused limb of the body to recover its strength, and it was not until 1888 that the bishops hesitatingly and falteringly spoke on social problems. But a lot had been accomplished. The theological foundation had been built, and the Christian Socialists had made their experiments in co-operatives, won the confidence of trade unions, and founded the Working-Men's College.

III

It was the contribution of the Guild of St. Matthew under the leadership of Stewart Headlam to combine the social teachings of

Maurice with the thought of the Catholic Revival, and it is here that a new period begins in the reappearance of the English Church into the world of men and conflict. This vigorous group, acknowledging its debt to Maurice, set out to destroy the prejudices against the church, "to justify God to the people," and to awaken the clergy to the implications of the ideal of brotherhood grounded in the Incarnation. In 1889 another group, the Christian Social Union, whose outstanding leaders were Henry Scott Holland and Charles Gore, was formed. The platform of the C. S. U. is a far cry from the smugness and decadence of the Church a half a century before.

"This Union consists of members of the Church of England who have the following objects at heart:

1. To claim for the Christian Law the ultimate authority to rule social practice.
2. To study in common how to apply the moral truths and principles of Christianity to the social and economic difficulties of the present time.
3. To present Christ in practical life as the living Master and King, the enemy of wrong and selfishness, the power of righteousness and love."

It was this group which did the most to influence the bishops, and its chief concern was to inform the Church of the inhuman conditions under which many working people lived. Gore felt strongly that the rebellious spirit possessed by people outside the Church toward economic injustice should have been shared by the Church, and through pamphlets, sermons, the investigation of specific problems and the drawing up of "white lists" of clean industries, the Christian Social Union made a deep impression upon the Church. Since the founding of this group (in 1919 combined with the Navvy Mission and renamed the Industrial Christian Fellowship) the social interest of the minority groups has moved rapidly into the whole Church.

Baron von Hügel used to say that the Church as a whole must inevitably be more conservative than its prophetic individuals. This is one of the "costing" things about belonging to any great institution. The work of the prophetic groups or individuals he held to be analogous to the flight of lone bees from the hive who,

on their return, submit their contribution to the testing of the hive. This analogy can help to make clear the work of Maurice, Kingsley, Ludlow, Headlam, Holland, Gore, and a score of others who now lead similar prophetic groups in the immediate present. These men brought and are bringing to the Church the conception of a social Christianity which must claim "the ultimate authority to rule social practice." It was discovered by the Church to be a long-lost essential part of the Christian religion without which Christianity is a luxury doomed to die. Acting upon this conviction the Lambeth Conferences have spoken with increasing clarity and vigor upon the social questions of the day, and by 1911 social service departments were formed in almost all the dioceses of England. It has become increasingly clear also that Christianity cannot again become the soul of our culture unless in some manner it again attains a unity and confronts the world as a united movement. Interdenominational and ecumenical movements have thus received an impetus from those who saw deeply into the malady of modern civilization and the tragic social ineffectiveness of a divided Church. Chief among these inter-Church movements was the "Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship" which met in 1924, which was followed in 1929 by the "Council of the Christian Churches in England for Social Questions," and the great Oxford Conference on Life and Work with its great pronouncement on the Church and the economic order. The prophetic insight and work of these early pioneering individuals and groups has now been in part received into, not only the Church of England through its official pronouncements, but also into the thinking of the ecumenical Church.

The chaos and confusion of the present has brought forth one series of conferences, and one single conference which are destined to have a great effect upon the Church of England. The series of conferences is the Anglo-Catholic Summer School of Sociology which meets every summer at Oxford, and which, while studying specific problems, has kept before itself the problems of society as a whole. By considering in the light of Christian doctrine the ends

for which the functions of society are divinely intended, it has slowly formed a picture, dim at times, of what a Christian society should be, as well as interpreted to the Church and the world the real reasons for the present chaos and confusion in our civilization. Through its magazine *Christendom* this school of Christian Sociologists is working out the implications of the Oxford Movement about which Mr. Peck has written so ably.

The single conference was that held at Malvern in which a large and influential group in the Church of England stated to the world the general plan which the post-war society must follow. Malvern reveals to us that a large and influential minority in the English Church has stepped into the foreground to lead the country and to interpret the present disaster. The Malvern declarations, critical both of present society and of the present Church, cannot be understood without some knowledge of the long road that has been travelled since Maurice first set forth the theocratic principle and the Tractarians challenged the secularism of their day. Both of these groups are clear in their recognition that the Church, a distinct minority in a hostile or indifferent environment built to a great extent on anti-Christian principles, must once again, as in the days of the early Church, set out to baptize the world into Christ and become the soul of a new culture.

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SEMINARY STUDY AND PRACTICAL TRAINING *

By THOMAS JAMES BIGHAM, JR.

General Theological Seminary

The last great War showed up human nature in many ways, some glorious, most of them sad. And it showed up the terrible need for the peaceable Gospel of Christ in the lives of men and of nations. One thing among many that it showed very clearly in this regard was the need for adequately trained clergy who could unflinchingly discern and rightfully minister to the human needs that had brought on the cataclysm the saving truth of Christ. Even that out-standing prophet and deservedly famous pastor and chaplain for the forces, Studdert-Kennedy, gives voice to this when he repentantly describes how he came by the friendly but slighting nick-name, Woodbine Willie:

Of their travail and torture, Christ's fools,
Atoning my sins with their blood,
Who grinned in their agony sharing
The glorious madness of God.

Their name! Let me hear it—the symbol
Of unpaid—unpayable debt,
For the men to whom I owed God's Peace,
I put off with a cigarette.

What was needed were priests, not only priests learned in theology, not only priests devoted in their daily lives, not only priests able administrators of large parishes, not only priests real leaders in public worship, but also priests who could bring God's Peace to men and nations in need, priests who were true pastors to the people of God.

Yet theological education was largely unaware of any means to train its students in this vocation. It was never unaware of

* Read at Alumni Day, January 1941, at the General Theological Seminary.

the need for such pastoral gifts, nor of the value of them; but it knew of no ways to develop such gifts. Richard C. Cabot, a sympathetic observer and noted physician, wrote about the matter:¹ "It has been assumed apparently that skill and ability to help people in trouble could not be learned by practice while in the seminary . . . that men either had it by nature and instinct or lacked it . . . but that in any case it could not be taught. Against this assumption I put the experience of medical students and medical practitioners, most of whom can testify that during their medical course they learned this unlearnable art, not of course, as they would like to, not in that perfection which they could wish for, but vastly better than their own stumbling hesitating attempts when first they began." The writer then goes on to make a strong plea for what he calls a Clinical Year in the course of theological study, stressing the immeasurable values that attach to learning both theory and practice at the same time under the same auspices, pointing out how much more alive become theological and biblical study, sermon writing and the conduct of worship when they are close to the living realities of people's lives.

About the time that this plea was made theological circles, and this seminary not in the background, were turning their attention to methods of education that would lead to these results. Already in 1923 there had been founded three ventures with this in view, the Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students, the Cincinnati Summer School in Social Work, and the New York City Mission Society's course in Pastoral Training. The development during the years of these three ventures has been watched with keen interest by the Seminary which has generously given advice and aid to each of them in various ways, which has encouraged students to undertake training in them, and which has observed carefully the results of this training to students here during their seminary days and later on in their ministry. And looking over the catalogues of these years one sees that there have been arranged an increasing number of

¹ *Adventures on the Borderland of Ethics*, New York, 1926; page 2.

courses in which students can correlate the material of their practical training with theological studies, so that there can be real inter-relation between thought and practice and between the peace of God and the needs of men.

I

The needs that occasioned these educational experiments have not disappeared, as another great war in the world indubitably will show. The experiments are now well along, however, and are beginning to demonstrate the values of certain methods of training and the principles involved in the practical training that best supplements the seminary studies.

To turn our attention first to the facilities for training available to our students:

The Council for Clinical Training of Theological Students is an administrative organization that places students for training (mostly in the summer periods) in general hospitals, mental hospitals, and correctional institutions of approved standard and that makes provision for competent supervision of this training in each center by trained clergymen. The Council has pioneered in developing a supervisory program which will insure thorough and discerning study. It has centers in some fourteen institutions and takes as many as seventy students during the summer term. We have had some twenty students of this seminary undertake work with the Council. The Council is an inter-denominational organization, but it is worthy of note that many of its leaders are churchmen and that every year students from Episcopal seminaries, along with the Methodists and Presbyterians, lead the list in the number of students—which considering the numerical proportions of these groups shows a leading interest in this training among our students.

The Cincinnati Summer School for Social Work, now the summer session of the Graduate School of Applied Religion, takes students during the summer term of eight weeks. It places them in various social work agencies in the city of Cincinnati where they work under the supervision of the agency supervisors.

Besides the attention to individual problems of all sorts, the school takes advantage of the community organization of a city notable for its civic life. The School conducts a course of lectures and seminars that give theological interpretation of these practical experiences. Every year the School takes about thirty students, of whom usually four or five are from this Seminary.

The Pastoral Training course of the New York City Mission Society was during the past three years in close connection with the Seminary, being conducted with the advice of the Seminary, and being under the direction of one who was both on the staff of the Society and on the teaching staff of the Seminary. We are pleased to be able to report that the training now offered there is of a standard equal to that of the other courses mentioned. Its arrangements have the advantage of using a large Church agency as well as building upon the experience of the Council for Clinical Training with which it has affiliations. Fewer students can be accepted by the City Mission Society, usually eight or ten, of whom ordinarily three or four are from the General Seminary. These students are now placed for their training in a general hospital and in a school for delinquent boys, in both places under the supervision of trained chaplains of these institutions.

The Seminary at present is in consultation with the New York School of Social Work and the Community Service Society of this city (better known to many of you under the names of the two former organizations which have been recently merged, the Charity Organization Society and the Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor) looking toward the establishment this summer of another program of training. The program for the ten weeks course will include two parts. One is field work in family case work in the Community Service Society under the joint supervision of the agency's case supervisor and a staff member of the Seminary; the other part is study at the New York School of the basic social work materials and study at the Seminary of the correlation of them with theology. Thus the program is guarded against being for the seminarians extraneous to their studies and interests, a slight introduction to another professional

field patched onto their seminary course, by its continued theological orientation in both practical and theoretical matters. This program is of significance among the several experiments because of its new combination of elements already found useful: trained professional supervision, individual theological supervision, regular and organized study, and continuing correlation. And this of course with the values of two outstanding leaders in social work, the Community Service Society and the New York School of Social Work.

With these facilities the Seminary finds that slightly less than a fifth of the student body receives this sort of practical training some time during the three years a student spends here. And the attitudes gained in this training are shared by others who cannot take advantage of these facilities, so that they are of indirect benefit to other students also. The Seminary has provided courses to stimulate interest in this work and to offer the opportunity for assimilation of the material learned in it. Such courses are the regular courses in social work and in pastoral psychiatry; other courses in pastoral ministrations that involve case materials, in the contributions of clinical work to the study of ethics, in Christian evaluations of contemporary social problems and sociological theories, in rural sociology and the like are offered from time to time. The interests and skills of the summer training periods are not neglected during the winter study but are reexamined and interpreted in the light of the Christian Faith that is the content of the winter period of study. And thus there is possible the regular attention both to the great disciplines of theological education, and to crying needs of men and of society. It is along this line, we feel, that students learn to become able pastors who can mediate the peace of God.

II

Now I should like to turn our attention to the content of the educational processes that have been just sketched.

The results of such education have been a real knowledge of society, some real first-hand knowledge of human nature, some

realization of the abilities of other professions that are concerned with human welfare, a greater appreciation of the particular opportunities of the priest and of his distinctive contributions, and lastly some greater self-knowledge for the student to keep his particular prejudices from being obstacles to his priesthood, a self-knowledge which sometimes almost makes over his personality.

These results come about through the experiences of the training, but they come from those experiences because those experiences are interpreted, and because they are interpreted under careful supervision.

The experiences themselves are somewhat those of every parish clergyman, insofar as it is possible to approximate his work in a social agency or in an institution. They are those that occur in every community and in every parish. They are those that give real opportunity for seeing the extraordinary possibilities and activities of human behaviour. They do not much differ from the subject matters Dr. Cabot first found useful.² They are visiting the sick and prisoners, attendance upon the dying, consolation of the bereaved, advice as to marriage and parenthood, dealing with the problems of aged people, sex problems, matters of praise and blame, delinquency in children and adults, alcoholisms and drug addiction, insanity and feeble-mindedness, differences between men and women, race traits and race psychology, labor problems and political pressure groups, the art of conversation and the avoidance of gossip. The student is placed in some position where he can observe some of these things and participate in the treatment of them. He comes to see the intricacies of the problems and the variety of ways in which they must be dealt with. He is shown what human nature is like in its worst and at its best, in great degradation and in amazing achievements of courage and of grace.

Yet it forever remains true that experience by itself, the mere meeting of situations, the sheer doing of things may not be educating. It may only be confusing. Some people learn to swim by being thrown into deep water; some drown. And even those

² *Ibid.*, page 5.

who learn to swim do not just by contact with the water learn the difference between the breast-stroke and the three-beat Australian crawl, nor know which is the better in certain circumstances. Experience to be truly educative must be interpreted experience. It must be analyzed, critically evaluated, understood. Thereby one's part in any experience becomes a part of one's self and a controllable part of oneself. It is no longer the riding on the wave but the ability to swim toward a chosen destination. Experience itself may bewilder, may retard, or even irrevocably harm the student or those he is trying blunderingly to assist. Experience becomes education when it is made a part of oneself, understood as that through interpretation.

The increasing realization of this truth makes it possible now to formulate to some extent a list of the chief principles of interpretation, which enable the student to understand his experiences and which enable his supervisor to help him understand them. The list is tentative and not exhaustive, but it is a list that has emerged from these experiments as they have been conducted to date. These principles are submitted here to indicate to you some ways in which apparently unlearnable pastoral gifts can be learned, and some formulations which assist in the development of these gifts.

I take these principles to be seven in number and to be drawn from the three fields of sociology, psychology, and of theology. Let us take first the contributions of sociology, which is the study of the broad reaches of man's life in various races, classes, cultures, societies. Obviously the parish priest is concerned with such matters for he is ordinarily the leader of a congregation in its work and worship and always a priest in the *Church* of God, that divinely instituted social group in which the Incarnate Life continues and extends itself socially.

There is some irony in sociology springing from that vigorously worldly man, Auguste Comte, for its several schools agree at least on two concepts which are prominent in the thought of the other-worldly Church from which Comte was revolting. The two concepts which are principles of interpretation for us are the close

relation and interdependence of the individual and society, and the place within society for a variety of social groups.

(1) With the corporative state in sharp opposition to democratic individualism we are inclined to forget the possibility of holding that both exist. Both individual and society are real and important. We in America are not likely to forget that the individual is an entity but we are inclined to overlook the real existence of society as something more than a collection of individuals, a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, something which by its own life deeply affects the individual. But Tarzan's curious character reflects the curious society of which he was a member. Robinson Crusoe's continuous efforts to retain his civilized status cannot be unexpected. The dictum of an English philosopher deserves attention: Society is not more an abstraction than is the individual. Nor should we forget that in the doctrine of the Trinity principles of sociality and individuality are held together, nor that Christ became Man and a man, and that we are each offered salvation in the Body of Christ.

The pastor must bear in mind the particular social milieu from which each parishioner or penitent comes, the social setting to which he must adjust himself, knowing that setting to be woven into the very life of the person himself. Individual and society stand continuously in close relation and interdependence.

(2) With regimentation on one hand and equalitarianism on another we must not overlook the place of sociological groups within society. This is clear to us in Plato's or Marx's description of the functions of social classes, in feudalism's strata, in national or racial entities today. And in the Body of the Church all members have not the same function. It is said that even the angels with one work and one worship exist in differing orders. The pastor must bear in mind the usefulness and also the danger of categories, neat if large pigeonholes into which all people are poked. What observer can tell how much is give and how much is take, whether one is sinner or sinned against, whether he is one who carries disease or who also has caught it? Yet unmistakable

are the influences of particular backgrounds of race, class, religion, urban or rural environment.

Sociological thought shows to the pastor the background on which a person is to be viewed, a context in which more or less he is to be understood. And it shows to him the patterns and movements which he must preach for or against, which he must guide the individuals into or out of, lest his ministry lose its touch with the breadth of human realities. These principles from sociology make the student sensitively aware of the breadth of human affairs.

Psychology, particularly in the new psychologies, brings to the pastor's knowledge three tremendously useful principles of interpretation, for it reveals the depths of human nature, the deep-lying motives and methods and varieties of human behaviour.

(3) By it the close relationship and interdependence of body and mind is made abundantly clear. The pastor is not surprised to find physical causes producing mental effects, brain tumors distorting beliefs, paresis producing irresponsible action, anemia causing lack of faith, or vice versa, fears, interfering with appetite, guilt causing forgetfulness, hatred hardening the arteries. The symptomatology of faith, of hope, and of repentance exists now in a wider field. Tears may as easily be for show as for sorrow; the pious and subdued person may be just a perplexed and suppressed person. Body and mind exist in close relationship we find. Once more the doctrinal statement of the resurrection of the body to everlasting life speaks to us with a force not possible in the 19th century.

(4) A second contribution of psychology to our principles of interpretation is its revelation of the existence of the unconscious. I suppose that now one does not have to say the usefulness of the concept of the unconscious. It has always been true that actions speak louder than words, and now in new phrases science with clinical material tells us that there is meaning in behaviour, and that we are no more aware of a great part of our thought processes than of a ship that passes in the night. And sometimes these processes surprise us into strange actions and sometimes they

reveal curiously the disordered part of our lives. We discover how much the past rises to hit us in the face, how powerful are half-forgotten memories, how strong are common human instincts.

This concept is the most noted, or perhaps the most notorious, of modern psychology but it should not be surprising. It does not mean a complete determinism, and all along the Church has been saying that the will has but an imperfect freedom. Just as theology has never been content with either alone but has seen something in both S. Augustine and Pelagius, so now the choice allows both Freud and our Dutch uncle.

The concept suggests the enormous importance of the whole life picture. What the Church has been saying about the decisive moral importance of individual thoughts and deeds and experiences is true from the very beginning of his life. What we have been saying about background and the importance of fine Christian family life is true in a more profound and subtle sense than we knew. The trained pastor is not surprised to discover love and hate side by side, nor profanity in religious people, nor the Fatherhood of God a concept needing considerable balance by negative theology, nor conversion an experience with in each instance a long history, and, it is hoped, far-reaching consequences. The pastor is prepared to allow resentment against authority to be taken out on him when he serves *in loco parentis*. He looks beyond the complaints to the complainer, beyond the flattery to the flatterer, beyond the thefts to the child desiring attention, beyond the accusations to the person treasuring guilt. And he is not surprised for he knows that baptismal waters do not wash away self-regarding instincts of original sin but rather incorporate one into a life where unmoral materials can be offset and re-ordered.

(5) A third contribution of modern psychology to the professional knowledge of the thoughtful clergyman is some description of normal life. The pathological states noted by Freud show plainly the importance of love; his researches show it mostly by way of its perversion, but there is many a fine law honored more in the breach than in the observance. In a similar converse fashion Jung's work shows us the need for security and Adler

with his popularized phrases on inferiority shows us the real need of the human being for significance. The normal life does involve these elements; and where they have had no chance for development some difficulty can be anticipated.

These three principles from psychology help the student to become more sensitively aware of the depths of human nature, for psychology brings tremendous treasures for the information of the priest and for other professional groups that deal with human problems. There is danger that such knowledge will displace the theological study of the pastor and that in a desire to be familiar with the materials and methods of other workers he will find himself too fascinated. This is a real danger to him and to others, both to them that want spiritual sustenance and find none and to them that need psychological guidance and get the wrong kind. Warnings cannot be too severe that the shoemaker should stick to his last, lest serious damage be done. Yet there is equal danger that new knowledge be identified with heresy and orthodoxy than be identified with ignorance. There is real and urgent need for careful study and guided experiment in the relationships of psychology and religion. For a good while, however, most of us will have to be content to take from our treasures things old and things new.

In taking things new, one must not neglect things that are old. Nor for sociology or psychology can the true priest neglect the queen of the sciences and the particular professional knowledge of the priest, theology.

(6) Theology has been defined as sayings of men who only talk to each other, something completely removed in terminology and content from life and its living, a sad but unfortunately not unjust description of much that one hears. The importance of theology lies however in its ability to express and thereby to preserve and convey the truth about the nature of God and his relations to men and their consequent relations to each other. Theology is the intellectual expression of religion, enabling the reasoning of the Gospel to make a "Gospeler" reason, enabling the Faith by expression to make an impression.

What is needed then in connection with theology and what is absolutely essential to a pastor who expects to guide people in paths toward God—and not in swamps and quicksands by errors lightly held, nor in paths toward himself by sentiment and dependence—is that the pastor search more and more deeply into the practical values of religion. This is the sixth principle of interpretation. He must see in doctrines not an intellectual puzzle but words and thoughts that are straining after the truth, that have so caught the truth that they carry meaning. He must so see doctrine that, e.g., the Ascension cannot be thought of as an ancient levitation to the top floor of the universe but rather as the recognition of the true dignity of our human natures in eternal communion with God which comes from the earnest of that dignity in the position of Christ's manhood. He must see suffering not as an intellectual enigma, but as something practicable for devotion, an evil to be eradicated; or, if unavoidable, to be met as a recognition of Divine sovereignty, a refinement of the gold, or an opportunity to fulfill in ourselves the sufferings of our Lord.

So too with moral commandments. They must be interpreted not as the arbitrary will of a capricious Deity but as the basic accord with Ultimate Reality necessary for man's health; honesty, e.g., not as an unfortunate requirement that stands in the way of commercial success, but as the deep-lying accord of man with man and man with God that no commercial civilization can totally obscure.

And so too with devotions. However robust it seems to remove the antiquarian air of liturgics, the pastor must let it live. Prayer must be not just an old custom, but a present living communion. Meditation must be made known not as a complicated substitute for thought but as a free way of lifting the mind to God. Liturgy must be seen as the way that in social action before God emotion is expressed without being exposed, thought is joined with action, work and play are united for God's great glory and our great good. The Eucharist must be seen as the returning of thanks to God for Himself and His mighty Acts for us, through

the complete self-offering of man and men made possible in the self-offering of the God-Man.

(7) In dealing with these values there must be understanding of the realities in them, and there must be seen the realities in the various traditions within Christianity, and of the various combinations of traditions that influence individuals and groups. The minister must be prepared to speak the language of many sorts of people. And he must be prepared to understand its dialects, idioms and nuances, even if—or especially if—he hopes to widen its vocabulary and improve its style. In a sense this use of the terminology which the person himself is accustomed to may be like speaking a foreign language. Phrases about the Fall, about the blood of the Lamb, about the right hand of the Majesty on high do not come as naturally to some minds as to others; but communication is possible even in a foreign tongue. However mythological the expression or however crude the picturization, the reason they are held is not the crudity nor the mythology; the reason is always the truth or aspect of the truth that is to be found in them. One must probe among the values and part-values of the words and thought-forms for the realities in them.

Because practical values will stand a pragmatic test does not mean that they will not also stand an ontological test. To act *as if* doctrines were true and disciplines demanding and devotions real does not mean that they are not true and real. And the pastor must be prepared to explain why they are true as well as why they are useful, to know that the values are real as well as practical. By these theological principles the student is made sensitively aware of the heights of human nature when it is awakened to God's action in it.

These seven principles of interpretation have proved invaluable in the daily supervision of students' work, in the training that is to make him sensitively aware of the needs of men and of the Gospel of God, ways in which his awareness is broadened, deepened, heightened.

It must of course be said that the arrangements for practical training may not be the best that can be devised. They obviously

fail in some practical ways, such as not including a great majority of the students, a difficulty that could be more easily remedied if there were more funds available. And they may fail in some theoretical ways, such as not providing parish settings for the pastoral work. But none of those most interested in these programs would claim perfection for them. Nor would it be claimed that these arrangements are as yet ready to be made requirements, nor that they are the only method of training skillful pastors. There comes to my mind the priest who in many ways is the greatest pastor I am privileged to know, a man whose training never included even the beginning experiments along these lines. But he for himself accomplished these things by his own methods. In vacation periods he would attend police court in the morning, read the poets in the afternoon and go to the theatre in the evening. While this training was highly individual, it is apparent that it involved for him the interpretations set forth here. If we by regular methods can increase the opportunities for this knowledge of life and of the Living Reality in whom it lives and moves and has its being, let us not delay.

There is a suggestive choice of words in the Eucharistic blessing; we speak of God's blessing as being the knowledge and love of God. Knowledge and love must ever go together for the true fruits of the holy life or even of the good life. We must not just know about God, nor just know about people; we must also love God and love men. And the converse is equally true, that we must know God and men as well as love them. Indeed, that is how we come to love them. The increased knowledge and love of men made possible through practical training, joined to and informed with the knowledge and love of God which the student finds in his studies and prayers here in the Seminary—that is what makes the true priest and the able pastor, who can bring God's Peace to men, and not, as Studdert-Kennedy feared, have to put them off with a cigarette.

THE REJECTION OF ISRAEL: AN ANALYSIS OF ROMANS IX-XI *

By ROBERT M. HAWKINS

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Whenever one reads Romans ix-xi as a whole, he may be left with the vague feeling that all's well that ends well. Israel is not, after all, to be ultimately lost. But if any serious attention is paid to those details which attempt to explain the cause of her present rejection, one is apt to be left in hopeless confusion. Some of the quotations from Scripture seem particularly inept.

Closer study should reveal that the confusion arises from the circumstance that all of the materials found in these three chapters are not written from the same point of view. We have not one explanation of the rejection of Israel, but three, two of which can be held at the same time without contradiction, but also a third which would make any other unnecessary, and which cannot be integrated with the two others without an absolute logical contradiction. Recognition of the complex character of these materials will at once remove the ineptitude of the quotations from Scripture. They are skillfully made, and are quite telling. But it is evident, or it should be, that they are not all marching in the same direction.

It is a comparatively simple task to separate these explanations each from the others, and to assign to each its proper materials. But to follow out the resulting problems, and to determine just what forces have added the extraneous materials to the Epistle to the Romans, and at what time, and under what circumstances the modification which is postulated took place, is a task which must perhaps wait upon the complete analysis of the Epistle, if not indeed of the entire Pauline Corpus, and which must find its place in

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the study of the interplay of various forces in the development of early Christianity.

Chapter ix starts with the expression of Paul's grief that Israel has been rejected. But this does not mean that God's word has come to nought. For God's purpose had not from the beginning applied to all of the seed of Abraham. There had always been a distinction between the children of promise, and the children of the flesh. Verse 9 brings us to our first quotation from the Scripture, which is cogent: *Sarah* shall have a son; it is to him the promise will apply.

The student of Pauline thought will at once recognize that we are within the familiar framework, as found in Galatians, that the true children of Abraham are those who have faith. As it has turned out, these are the Gentiles who have had faith in Christ. They are the heirs of the promise. Since this distinction is original, the state of affairs in which the Israelites are rejected because of their refusal to have faith in Christ, and the Gentiles are accepted, needs no justification. This is what God had always intended. The seed of Abraham had always been reckoned spiritually, rather than physically.

That this thought is basic to the development of Paul's argument throughout the chapter immediately appears. The quotation from Hosea in verses 25 and 26 that those who were not his people are to be called his people, the sons of the living God, is powerfully appropriate in establishing the incredible fact that it is the Gentiles who are to be called the people of God, the beloved. In verses 30-33 it is pointed out in terms so plain that none should misunderstand that it is the Gentiles who have attained unto righteousness, while the Israelites, who had sought it, had fallen short.

And this is their own fault! God had provided the way. A stone had been laid in Zion; it should have been built upon; indeed it should have become the head of the corner. But because Israel would not believe on him, it had become a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence; Israel had in consequence been put to shame. She had had her chance, but she had refused to take it.

While nothing can obscure Paul's realization that Israel herself, and alone, was to blame for her failure to obtain righteousness, it is by no means easy to determine precisely his idea of the way in which she had failed to attain. He might have thought that a better performance in keeping the law would have reached the mark; or he might have been convinced that no one could attain unto righteousness except through faith in Christ. Whether verse 4 in chapter x be regarded as genuine, or, as it might well be, a gloss, its interpretation would go far toward solving this question.

The first eight verses of chapter x seem to have been part of an original elaboration of the position that Israel failed when she might have succeeded. Paul's argument might have been that while obedience to the law required a high standard of performance, it was by no means an impossible demand. For the law was not far off, nor inaccessible; it was near them, in their mouth and in their heart. It is most instructive to note the patent modification of this material quoted from Deuteronomy. The original is altogether concerned with the law; and at that, with its accessibility, and the possibility of keeping it. But as it now lies before us it has been modified (by palpable glosses) to make it refer to Christ. And that which was of its very essence has been stricken out, viz. "*that thou mayest do it.*" Without this modification, these verses would have been an altogether intelligible furtherance of the argument of the previous chapter; the possibility of righteousness had been provided for Israel, but she would not.

Verses 9-17, or 18, in the form in which they lie before us, are obviously from a much later time, and proceed from an utterly different point of view. They are a product of the later preaching mission of the church, when "the word" was proclaimed; men heard it and "believed" it; they then "made confession" unto salvation. Their preoccupation with this evangelistic mission is quite evident from their concern that missionaries be sent by the church; for if they are not sent, how can they go? And

if the church shall not do its duty in the sending of missionaries, the entire evangelistic mission will collapse.

In verses 19–21 Paul's genuine argument is clinched with appropriate and cogent quotations from Deuteronomy and Isaiah which show that the Scripture had taught that Israel would be provoked by the Gentiles, and that the Lord would be found by those who asked not of him. But Israel had been disobedient and gainsaying, although the Lord had plead with them all the day with tenderly outstretched hands.

This is a complete and sensible solution of the problem of the Rejection of Israel. It must have satisfied the logic of Paul's mind; it could not satisfy the longing of his heart.

For chapter xi continues with a more positive approach. God has not cast off his people, neither have they stumbled that they might fall. Paul, a son of Abraham, an Israelite, magnifies his ministry to the Gentiles, in the hope that he may provoke his own people to a jealousy which shall cause them to emulate the Gentiles, so that, even though it be at long last, as the first fruit is holy, so may the entire lump be, and as the root is holy, so also may be the branches.

It is doubtful if any more of the genuine materials can be recovered from these chapters. There is a rather pale reflection in verses 25–32 of chapter xi of the Pauline point of view; there is in them the same optimistic estimate of the ultimate fate of Israel, but that estimate proceeds from very different premises.

It is certain that the disagreement of verses 17–24 with their context is so violent that we must take them to be a contradiction, rather than a correction of the Pauline point of view. In them there is not only a denial of the basic Pauline position, but an absolute contradiction in the connotation assigned to the fundamental terms. It is an utterly different "universe of discourse."

In Paul's thought, the first fruit, whose principle of sanctity will ultimately leaven the entire lump, and the root which will ultimately give life to the branches, *must* be taken to refer to the Gentiles who have had faith in Christ. But in these verses the Gentiles are rebuked by a Jewish sympathizer, who points out that,

after all, it is the Jews who are the root, and the Gentiles are branches who have no proper place. They are wild olive branches, grafted into the true stock of the children of Abraham. Paul may be absolved from the charge of an appalling ignorance of horticultural procedure, as well as from the much more serious charge of an inability to carry the basic connotation of terms forward from one verse to the next, by recognition of the evident fact that we are here dealing with secondary materials which have no value except to exhibit the fanatical Jewish bias of some of the forces which have found expression in their modification of the original epistle.

It has been found a comparatively simple task to recover from these chapters a clear, consistent argument, buttressed with apt and cogent quotations from Scripture, that God's purpose had been neither violated nor modified: he had always intended that the promise should apply to those who had faith. These have proved to be the Gentiles, and it is hoped that their attainment will ultimately provoke Israel to join them in the fellowship of a like faith. Israel might have been included therein; her exclusion is due solely to her own willful and obstinate disobedience in the face of God's persistent and passionate pleading.

A second point of view, which does not seem very important, but which might well be taken by itself as a complete answer to the question of the Rejection of Israel, is that God's purpose had always been confined to a small portion of Israel, and that at best only a remnant was to be saved. There is surprisingly little material colored with this point of view, only ix: 27-29; xi: 2-6, 17-24, and 25. If we concede to the annotator any intelligence in the use of the Scripture, xi 3 and 4, add the comforting thought that this remnant is larger than one might think.

This cannot be taken to be the Pauline point of view, because it does not seem to reflect his idea of either the past or the future. It is all of Israel, as opposed to the Gentiles, and not some fraction of the holy people, which has failed. And he hopes that in the future all of Israel, and not just a major fraction thereof, may be saved. The philosophy of the remnant cannot be taken as an ex-

position of Paul's thought in regard to either the past or the future.

There remains a third point of view, vitally important for both theology and religion. It may well have been added by some one who was unable to rest quietly under Paul's stinging indictment of the Jews. It is clearly stated; it is forcefully argued; and it is buttressed with a telling array of quotations from the Old Testament.

This point of view holds that the failure of Israel is due to no lack of her own, but solely to the sovereign and wholly irresistible purpose and power of God. Ignoring all that has been said as to the stubborn refusal of Israel, this point of view holds that God exercises an arbitrary and unchallengeable right over men, such as the potter over the clay, to appoint some to honor and some to destruction. His purpose is thought of as so utterly independent of human agency or merit that its functioning is referred to the prenatal life in which merit and agency alike are conceived of as impossible. It cannot be resisted; to question it is blasphemy.

It will at once be seen that this point of view constitutes a complete and final answer, not only to this question of the rejection of Israel, but also to practically every other question which the mind of man can frame. God does as he pleases; he hardens and he softens whom he will. This must be taken as absolute and final. It is useless to raise the question, "If God had made up his mind to harden Israel, why should he have ever made any promise to Abraham?" The promise was given to Abraham, and to his seed, but God had seen to it that their hearts were hardened so that they could not attain to the state of grace therein contemplated. God must have made this promise with a left hand which did not know what his right hand was doing!

It would seem to be utterly impossible to accept this third point of view as the Pauline solution of the problem of the Rejection of Israel. Paul still hopes that all of Israel may be saved, that all may be included in the holy lump and branches. This hope does not rest upon any expected change in the attitude of God, but upon the possibility of a change in Israel's own choice of faith.

It should be decisive to note that this point of view cannot be reconciled with either Paul's conception of Israel's attitude, or his picture of the nature and conduct of God. As to Israel, it should be impossible to read these chapters without seeing that Paul held that a way had been provided for Israel, which she rejected, but that she might yet, if only she would, accept the way which God was not only providing, but urging upon her.

The very climax of pathetic absurdity is reached in an attempt to harmonize the two fundamental conceptions of God underlying our materials, and to think of him as holding out his hands in tender and persistent pleading all through the day, and yet with those same outstretched hands, pitilessly hardening those over whom he was yearning, so that they could not possibly accede to his entreaty. Apart from its absurdity, this would seem, at least to me, a blasphemy far greater than to question the arbitrariness or omnipotence of predestination.

CONSCIENCE

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Whatever else the conscience may be, it certainly is not that which it has so often been considered—a sort of mentor residing at the heart of one's being, which with infallible precision indicates the rightness or wrongness of any act, and directs the moral agent to do or not to do this act. Psychological investigation has fairly well proved that there is no such guide or ruler in man's make-up; so far as we can discover, there is no special organ or factor which has especially assigned to it the task of making moral judgments, and leading man into the path of right.

On the contrary, we may affirm, in the light of psychological enquiry, that conscience, if we still wish to retain the word, is the whole man functioning in specifically moral situations. That would imply as an immediate corollary that the conscience is not an infallible arbiter; it is not the absolute and master ruler of the emotions, the will and the intellect; rather it is the way these all function, as a unity, in situations in which the questions which we differentiate as moral habitually arise. It varies with the agent; it does not pronounce the same judgments for all people on the same question; it is indefinitely educable, and it is likewise indefinitely open to dulling from misuse or "disobedience," if the latter word may be employed in this connection at all.

In this whole self when functioning as a moral agent—that is, when conscience is operative—there are the three usual divisions, which have been taken over from the old faculty psychology, and which are not to be regarded today as distinct in the sense of quite separate and absolutely monadlike activities of the person, but as ways of that single individual's activity, an activity in which he engages as an organic whole. These may be termed the cog-

nitive, the affective and the conative or volitional. Let us discuss them in that order.

In practically all moral activity, perhaps in all, the intellectual or cognitive aspect of the person plays a large part. While it is not true to say that goodness depends on knowledge of the specific amount of good there is in a given situation, it is undoubtedly true to say that a man will develop in his moral actions if he has an increasingly clear idea of that which as a matter of fact really is good. And this can be determined, it would appear, in no other way than by knowledge or cognition. Man can know the good, and knowing it, can adapt his conduct and his affections towards that good.

The scholastic moral philosophers were fond of saying that the conscience is the intellect of man functioning in moral situations, or as they might have put it, functioning conscientiously. To them, then, the conscience of a man was largely the manner in which he thought of the moral problems which faced him, and the application of general moral principles of which he was aware to specific problems with which he was faced was the work of a real subdivision of his moral nature. We might not adopt this particular type of division, but yet the truth remains that as man increases in his knowledge of moral principles, that is, of what is *the good*, and applies such knowledge to the one-after-another situations in which he finds himself, he is functioning at his highest as a moral agent.

While it is easy enough to say this, it is difficult to show how the conscience can be educated. What may be said is that it is in the light of increasingly adequate moral principles, covering an increasingly large area of experience, that man grows more and more intimately aware of the great significance of the immediate moral situations. That is to say, when a man understands that absolute goodness in conduct covers not merely the realm of personal morality but also social relations with his family, his friends, his nation and the world, his conscience is being educated so that he can use the situations in which he finds himself to express these growing certainties. There will of course be certain tempera-

mental differences; this cannot be avoided in view of the very varying nature of individual men. One man will see the good in wider perspective than another; and still another will be more ready in noting the particular applications of this good in the daily round. But it is clearly an obligation to grow so far as we can in discernment both of the universal good, and of its relation to concrete situations; and no man can be termed a fully developed moral agent if he has not sought in his own life to grow along these two but closely parallel lines.

The affective function of the moral agent is perhaps secondary to the cognitive, and yet it is always present in any moral judgment or act. Whether we like it or not, we cannot be said to act morally unless we have some quite definite feeling-tone in connection with our activity. Merely indifferent motion can hardly be called moral. The emotions of love, shame, admiration, hate, righteous indignation—severally either primary or secondary emotions in moral action—are clearly and intimately concerned in our every deed and thought and word, insofar as these have moral significance. Here the duration of the feeling-tone may vary with individuals and with situations; there may be certain persons who are of a distinctly melancholy or a generally cheerful type; on the other hand there may be certain situations which inevitably produce one feeling-tone or another. Certainly, however, it is necessary to say that such tones as shame, indignation, obligation, love, are essential to the developed moral man, and any "conscience" which does not have them does not deserve the name which is applied to it.

The third function of the moral agent is the conative. In actual moral situations, the intellectual factor plus the emotional urge or the feeling-tone leads to the will or the action which results. In other words, the fully moral act includes all three in a unity. And the last is just as inevitable a part of the moral agent's make-up as are the former two. We could hardly speak of a conscientious person who knows the good, and has a feeling of love or obligation in regard to it, but never carries these into practical operation. Just how free the agent may be in his

activity is a matter concerning which there is a vast difference of opinion; and we have no space here to discuss the problem. It is sufficient to say that in any moral action there is at least the feeling that the agent is responsible and free, and all experience is for some measure of reality in this feeling. In other words, it seems to be implicit in moral experience that we can in some degree, however slightly, exercise a measure of control over our actions, if only in the sense of "plumping" for a good which we happen to like, and in that manner making it possible for it to fulfil itself in act. In this matter of conation there will also be differences with different people. Not all will respond in action as quickly as others, to the good as it is presented to them in moral situations, and with the proper affective tinge. But there will always be some response, even if it is extraordinarily slight, else the action cannot properly be called moral.

We have so far seen that conscience may be defined as the moral agent in his three-fold make-up of intellection, affection and conation. All three are involved in conscience, and all three are involved in moral act. The self, as moral agent, knows a good, feels that in some degree he approves it, and acts as a result of that approval; and these three are bound together indissolubly.

For the Christian, the supreme good is the vision of God. This supreme good is not merely the object of contemplation, as the intellectual aspect of personality might view it. It is also the object of desire—God is the altogether lovely; he is that good which our affective nature most profoundly approves. And he is the object of our striving; he is both the one who incites and the one who is the goal of our action. The revelation of God in Christ has given us a very concrete and human picture of the supreme good, the supreme object of desire, and the supreme end of striving. Towards that object all our moral action should in the long run be directed, seeing God not merely *above* all things but *in* all things. Thus morality itself is lifted from a mere dry conformity to abstract moral principles as worked out in specific situations, into the much richer realm of service of God in the concrete affairs of here and now, in the faith that the result of our

labor will be the beatific vision, where there will be a complete satisfaction of our intellectual, affectional and conational self. From this point of view, conscience is the total activity (cognitive, affective and conative) of the self, towards the Divine Being, found in its inchoate or germinal form in the lowest of human beings, and gradually purified and elevated as man more and more comes into the knowledge of the true nature of Deity, and therefore more and more learns the will of that Deity for him, and approving that will, seeks to perform it in the trivial round and the common task. And at the end, as at the beginning, it is true that in God's will is our peace.

"THE SOUL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA "

By EDGAR LEGARE PENNINGTON

Church of the Holy Cross, Miami

The Soul of Czechoslovakia. By Arthur Stuart Duncan-Jones. London: Herbert Barber, 37 Museum street, 1941, pp. 63. 6d.

This little book is an essay on "the Czechoslovak contribution to Christian civilization." The break-up of Czechoslovakia resulted from strategic considerations; but those who were acquiescent in the face of the sacrifice of that nation are growing to realise that the policy of "appeasement," by which the little country lost its independence, was in reality a defeat for England and France. After all, strategic considerations are not the only ones. "It is the purpose of this pamphlet to consider whether in fact the Czechs, by reason of their history, do not possess certain spiritual qualities which should be preserved for the common good; qualities which, if they are to be made available for that common good, must find expression in the free atmosphere of an independent and properly constituted State."

The author feels that the Czechoslovaks constitute a people, who, owing to a combination of native characteristics and of historical experiences, have a contribution to make to the common stock. Planted for more than thirteen centuries in the very heart of Europe, they have stood in the path of the oriental nomads; they have from early days displayed an instinct for the fundamental elements in civilization, being devoted to the cultivation of the land and the formation of a social life far more than to military conquest. In an age of conquerors, their peace-loving and industrious habits led to their continual subjugation. Under those circumstances, however, they developed a mystical outlook and a passion for justice. After their conversion to Christianity, between the year 850 and 1000, they proved a favourable soil for "social religious dreams of an evangelical way of life" (Dr. Peisker, in the *Cambridge Mediæval History*, II, 457). The Slav temperament was exemplified in the unity of the Bohemian and Moravian Brethren, which is described as a democratic movement, "not communistic . . . a wonderful theoretic union of human perfection with spiritual purity in the midst of a society saturated with selfishness."

Bohemian Christianity come from Constantinople; the apostles of Bohemia were Slav-speaking Greeks, Cyril and Methodius. The German missionaries' efforts had failed; these men from the East were able to convert the heathen Czechs by the sanctity of their lives and their ability to address them in the mother tongue. By inventing a Slavonic script and translating the liturgy into their language, they gave to the Czechs the honour of laying the foundation of all subsequent Slavonic Orthodox Christianity. Bohemian Missionaries carried the faith to Poland and Hungary; Ludmila and Wenceslas were Bohemian saints.

Ultimately the tradition of a Slavonic Christianity died out in Bohemia, and the Church became a part of Western Christianity. Although local legends kept alive the memory of national saints, the Bohemians profited by their contact with the main stream of European culture.

Defended and surrounded by their mountains, the Czechs created a political independence of their own and also a unique culture. Until the Ninth Century they formed with the Slovaks a united Slavonic state. In the following century, the Slovaks were subdued by the Magyars; and their land remained a part of Hungary until the end of the World War. The relations between the Czechs and Slovaks remained very close, however; there was interchange of ideas and customs, and the Slovak Protestants acknowledged their allegiance to the heritage of the Czech Reformation. It was only natural that after 1918 the Czechs and Slovaks should unite in a common state. Adolf Hitler, in his attempt to effect the disintegration of Europe, realised that a strong union of the two peoples was a formidable obstacle in his path.

Dr. Duncan-Jones briefly reviews the situation which Bohemia maintained during the days of the Holy Roman Empire. Strengthened by the Golden Bull of Emperor Frederick II, having the advantage of a succession of remarkable rulers, enjoying cultural influences and a healthy economic life, the Bohemians were a privileged people. The land became the centre of a rich and diversified culture. Powerful as were the German forces, the Czechs resisted efforts at cultural domination. The national spirit remained unquenchable. Bohemia had a University in 1348, before any had been founded in German lands. The University of Prague retained a strongly Czech character from its foundation till 1622, when the Hapsburgs changed it into a strictly Catholic Latin University.

There is an interesting chapter on the sources of the Czech Reformation. The corruption and worldliness which marked the Western Church in the Fourteenth Century were notable in Bohemia; thither the teachings of John Wycliffe had penetrated. The Emperor, Charles IV, strove hard against the degrading tendencies of the clergy, and threw his protection over two priests, Conrad Waldhauser an Austrian and John Milic a Moravian, who were unsparing in denouncing the immorality of their day. Those men gave a powerful impetus to the reform movement among the Czechs; and it is said that through this movement the Czechs discovered their soul. From the first, the Bohemian movement for reform evinced a strongly social interest. Matthew of Janov published a denunciation of the tyranny of the nobles and clergy who trampled on the poor.

The reforming movement came to a climax in John Hus, though there had been earnest preachers and thinkers before his time. An earnest, zealous man, he was endowed by disposition and education to prove a leader. His sermons were renowned; he encouraged the Czechs to sing the hymns which were part of their racial tradition, thereby attaching popular hymnody to the actual liturgy and introducing a period afterwards widely adopted in German-speaking lands. "Under the impulse of Hus, the Czechs developed a rich hymnody which has passed into the treasure house of the universal Church through the Lutheran development. Luther said that his 'Jesus Christus unser Heiland' was John

Hus's hymn 'verbessert.' Hus's appeal was not limited to the common folk; he was made the confessor of Queen Sophie and he was appointed preacher to the clergy of Prague at their synod. But after a few years opposition developed. Hus's denunciations were resented. The climax came at the Council of Constance in 1414-1415. Hus, betrayed and deceived, died a martyr's death. Burned at the stake, he died singing the Czech hymn, "Christ, Thou Son of the living God, pity, pity Thou me." His ashes were thrown into the Rhine but his spirit marches on in the hearts of the Czech people, to whom he gave an example of one who chose to obey God rather than men. Hus, says our author, "endowed them with the conviction that they were called, in a special decree, to be the paladins in Europe of the liberty of the Gospel. Hus made Czech nationality so sacred a thing that Catholic and Protestant among them can both feel a pride in this selfless, gracious, courageous figure."

The century that followed the death of Hus, though marked by savage warfare, raised the Czechs to an eminence in the affairs of Europe. They became champions of individual and community freedom. The application of the Christian faith to the social life remained the dominating influence for nearly a century. The burning of Hus did not stamp out the revolutionary heresy of the base-born barbarians, as the kings and prelates expected; the reaction in Bohemia was strong, and quite 450 nobles signed a dignified protest, asserting that Hus was a good and righteous Catholic, who led men not into error but to Christian love and the keeping of God's commandments.

The Hussites fell into two groups—a conservative and a radical section. The former did not wish to break with the Church, but hoped to effect a reform, with a pious and self-sacrificing priesthood and with a laity who would be granted their rightful place. Communion in both kinds became a rallying point. The radical group of Hussites denied the Real Presence, the veneration of the saints, and the doctrine of purgatory. They were iconoclasts and set little store by the ordained ministry. They looked for the speedy coming of Christ, and a consequent sharing of all things in common. They reacted against the crusade which Pope and Emperor proclaimed against Bohemia violently; they burned monasteries, libraries, and images. In 1420, the more moderate and learned of their group produced the Four Articles of Prague, which became the Covenant of the Hussite movement.

"First, that the Word of God should be preached throughout Christendom, which is not yet done;

"Secondly, that the real body of Christ and His holy blood shall be administered to all true Christians, young and old;

"Thirdly, that no priestly dominion from the supreme priest, that is, the Pope, down to the lowest and most insignificant, be allowed, either in respect of estates and fees, and that laymen shall frustrate this priestly dominion;

"Fourthly, that all manifest sins shall be checked, whether of kings, nobles, governors, priests or other spiritual or lay persons."

This programme became the basis of all the Hussite parties in the ensuing struggle. Jan Zizka showed himself a military leader of genius; and the victories of the first few years, over much larger forces, were chiefly due to Zizka's skill. One must not forget, however, the unshakable conviction of the

Hussite peasants that they were fighting God's battles. When Zizka died of plague, a priest named Prokop became his successor; he too was a superb general. The Hussites were ruthless warriors, and for generations their name became a name of terror. Civil war and desolation were destined at length to have their effects. The Council of Basel made concessions, and it was conceded that "the Bohemians and Moravians who received the flesh and blood of God in both kinds were true Christians and genuine sons of the Church." There is reason to question whether so small a gain was worth the loss of so much blood. War had brought its demoralisation; "much of the earlier humanitarian and cultural ideals of the Hussites had faded out. Large tracts of country were depopulated. . . . But the substantial point was that the lamp of reform was unquenched." The Czech people retained their sense of mission. The great King George of Podebrady, a Czech and a Hussite, planned a permanent federation of Christian princes and nations to preserve peace and to defend Christendom from Islam. Rome opposed King George's efforts. The Hussite wars did not come to an end till the religious peace concluded at Kutna Hora in 1483. "In what affects the faiths in one or in both kinds, it is stipulated that one party shall neither abuse nor oppress the other, neither in worldly nor in spiritual matters, and that both will love each other. The priests of either party will freely preach the Word of God; neither will call the other heretic."

The Czechs at least were committed to religious toleration. Furthermore, Bohemian religion did not become stagnant. There were various developments traceable to the reform movement, conspicuous among which was the appearance of the *Unitas Fratrum* or Bohemian Brethren. It was inspired by a pious farmer, Peter Chelcicky, who yearned to make the law of Christ the actual rule of men's lives. He held fast to a belief in the Real Presence, but wished for a Church in every way dissociated from the State. He advocated a Church unspotted by the world. A complete pacifist, he regarded all shedding of blood as sinful. His interests were practical and social rather than theological. The *Unitas* began as a movement in a remote village called Kunvald. It rejected the Roman system and started an episcopate of its own. While subsequently modifying its position on the subject of worldly occupations, it never abandoned its ideal of the equality of all Christians. The Brethren founded schools, produced a splendid Czech translation of the Bible, and gave to the world a rich harvest of hymns.

The year 1516 marked a decisive turning-point in the history of the Czechs. Their throne left vacant by the death of their ruler, they turned to the House of Hapsburg and elected Ferdinand I as King of Bohemia. This was the beginning of a domination which lasted for four centuries. While the country was strengthened in many ways, the influence proved a blighting one. Efforts to join with the Lutheran Saxons were violently crushed by Ferdinand; and Jesuits were introduced into the land of John Hus. Religious difficulties persisted in the reigns of succeeding emperors. At last Bohemia went down in blood before a combination of Spain, Austria, and Rome; the Protestant lands refused to render assistance. The only country that afforded any help was

Holland. The battle of the White Mountain (8 November, 1620) was followed by the execution of the Czech leaders, the confiscation of vast areas of Czech property, and the exile of thousands of the people. It is said that fully a fourth of the Czech population left Bohemia for ever. "But though a dark night settled down on the Czech people, something still burned in their peasant homes, and it was from these that revival ultimately came. They preserved their language, and with their language their faith in the national destiny and in the Providence of God."

After the defeat of the White Mountain, the Czechs were forcibly Catholicized; their intellectual life became sterile. The Czech language was confined to the despised masses, while the German language was adopted by the upper classes. In time, however, the truly Christian elements in the Roman Catholic religion asserted themselves. There were Czech priests like Bohuslav Balbin, a Jesuit, who preserved the traditions of his people with loving care. Some of the priests adapted the hymns of the *Unitas* to Catholic use.

The desire for a proper recognition of their nationality did not die with the Czechs. In the Nineteenth Century there was a revival of study of Czech history, and the native language took on a recognised literary form. Gymnastics were promoted with energy and success. The Czechs showed themselves devoted to the arts. Love of song and the dance was inherent in them; and in Šmetana, the composer of *The Bartered Bride*, they produced a musician of the first rank. An even more renowned composer was Antonin Dvorak. "It is characteristic of these Czech composers that, on the one hand they refused to identify themselves with the current tendencies in German music though it would have been profitable for them to do so, and on the other, that they did not slavishly adopt the folk melodies of the Czech people, but through their impregnation by these melodies they produced original music at once Slavonic and modern."

In the middle of the last century, Karel Havlicek was able to embody the principles for which the Czech peoples had been striving in the past and to which they were to dedicate themselves. He was a fervent believer in Czech nationality; but he was sensible, practical, and well poised. The newspapers which he published in Prague expounded his view of the mission of the Czechs. His teachings were taken up by the great Thomas Masaryk, the man who exemplified the finest spirit of his country, and who was for nineteen years its president. When all the countries around Czechoslovakia fell under autocracies of one sort or another, the state that Masaryk inspired remained loyal to the principles of democracy. Its leaders conceived themselves as having a mission to promote peace and stability in central Europe. Dr. Benes, who had the direction of foreign affairs, was diligent in promoting the League of Nations. "On the cultural side," says Dr. Duncan-Jones, "the Czechs showed themselves to be the most liberal State East of the Rhine. There was perfect religious and academic freedom in Czechoslovakia. They were in fact an outpost of freedom and progress as these terms are understood in the democracies."

The Czechs and Slovaks are paying a bitter price for the failure of those who should have been their friends, to understand the contribution they were

making; but our author believes that they will rise again. In the words of their representative leader, Edvard Benes, "the present crisis in Europe and in the world is the continuation of the eternal fight for a better justice, for a better life, for a better political, national, cultural, economic, and social existence for the greatest number of individuals in the greatest number of countries in the world; the fight for a peaceful settlement of the conflicting interests, the fight for a longer period of peace and for better forms of collaboration between the nations and states in the world." In this "continuation of the fight for a better society," the Czechoslovakian people will make their contribution.

EDGAR LEGARE PENNINGTON.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

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In its present form Jer. 22:10-12 appears to be an oracle concerned with one Shallum, King of Judah. A number of scholars so take it, including Peake, whose modest commentary on Jeremiah is still the best all around treatment of the book available in English. Peake does allude to the questions raised concerning vv.11f. As early as Graf their explanatory nature was recognized. At the same time their essential accuracy was not questioned and the authenticity of v.10 has been universally assumed. This is the view of such representative scholars as Duhm, Cornill, Erbt, Giesebrrecht, H. Schmidt, Gillies and G. A. Smith. Giesebrrecht, in the tabular analysis given on p. xxi of the introduction to his commentary, assigned v.10 to Jeremiah and v.11f to Baruch. In the body of his work, p. 122, he is not so sure, remarking that it is doubtful whether these verses belonged to the "Baruch book" originally or were added at a later time. He feels it to be quite possible that Baruch added a short notice only, so that vv.11f received their definitive redaction later on. It is generally supposed that the addition of vv.11f was made relatively early as it gives us a tradition different from that of II Kings 23:30ff. Yet Duhm on the other hand feels that the redactor was aware that the exile had lasted for several generations. Granted that vv.11f preserve a correct tradition regarding the pre-coronation name of Jehoahaz, there is no reason why such a fact might not have survived independently of Kings for a century or more. Oral tradition bulked larger than we realize. The presence of genuine non-Kings material in Chronicles, for instance, should prevent us from dating vv.11f early, merely on the basis of the mention of Shallum.

There is no reason to reject the Jeremian authorship of v.10. It is a short enigmatic oracle of a type much more common in the prophetic books than has been recognized in the past. The prophet whetted the curiosity of his audience by a riddle-like utterance. The subsequent explanation was not preserved as it was all too obvious to the prophet's contemporaries, once it was given. The terse oracle circulated by itself. Welch, who usually recognizes the true nature of the prophetic oracles, has gone astray in this instance, following Condamin. He quite misses the point when he puts v.11a before v.10. This destroys the element of suspense and the question is answered before it is asked. The consensus of scholarly opinion is right then in regarding v.10 as the original oracle and v.11f as added at a later time but do these verses give us the correct explanation of the dead and the exiled of v.10? It is generally supposed that they do, that Jeremiah had Josiah and his son Shallum-Jehoahaz definitely in mind. Indeed Cornill goes so far as to restore the definite article from the Greek in

the case of *the* dead one in order to make the reference to a particular individual more conclusive. Yet the article is used very commonly in Hebrew in the indefinite sense of a member of a class, see Psalm 1. That may very well be what is meant here. Duhm hints at it when he notes that the redactor does not mention the exact place of Jehoahaz's exile and remarks, "Perhaps he has worded vv.11b, 12 in such general terms in order that they might fit not only Shallum but every exile; whoever went into exile would return no more." The better explanation for the redactor's reticence is probably his ignorance, another evidence of a considerably later date.

Nevertheless Duhm gives us a good suggestion, albeit unconsciously, as to the possible meaning of v.10 as originally uttered by Jeremiah. The prophet in other passages was bidden not to lament for the dead nor to rejoice with the merry-makers, 15:17; 16:5. So terrible a doom was coming upon the land that the little joys and sorrows of life would pale into insignificance before it. Verse 10 may well be an oracle in this same vein. Do not weep for the dead but for him who goes away, that is in exile. So terrible a doom was coming on the land it would be better to be dead than alive. We can imagine the prophet uttering his grim message at the funeral rites for some chance Hebrew dead. The one to lament over, the prophet says, is not the corpse before us but every man among the mourners. The dead are better off than we who must suffer the sack of Jerusalem and the subsequent captivity. Later on, probably under the influence of Jeremiah's consolatory message to the exiles chap. 29, the original meaning of the verse was misunderstood and applied to the royal Egyptian captive. The exile in itself was not so bad but how tragic Jehoahaz's untimely fate was in contrast to that of his father Josiah who died gloriously in battle after a long and pious reign! According vv.11f were added and the enlarged and misinterpreted oracle found its lodging place in the section concerned with the kings of Judah.

CORWIN C. ROACH.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century. By Kenneth M. Setton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 239. \$2.75.

This is an able and well documented work, which examines in detail the patristic attitude toward the office and person of the emperor in the fourth century. It is clearly written and preserves a good balance. The author has surveyed the general Christian literature of the period and not confined himself to works directly addressed to the emperor. He has, furthermore, enhanced the value of his work by contrasting the Christian attitude with that of the cultured pagan.

The book comprises chapters on Eusebius, Constans and Constantius, the Arians, Ambrose, Philosophy before the Throne, Chrysostom, and Imperial Images. Dr. Setton tells the stories of Ambrose and Chrysostom with no less interest than accuracy. His judgment of Eusebius as something more than a "servile flatterer" is most just (p. 53). He makes a number of interesting points, such as the fact that the Christian use of imperial epithets is distinguished by the absence of titles of cult significance (p. 31), and that the real struggle between the *sacerdotium* and the *imperium* began with the mutual usurpations of Athanasius and Constantius (p. 212). Furthermore, he points out how the tradition of Athanasius and Chrysostom, limiting the imperial power over the eastern Church, survived, despite the strong erastian tendency in the Byzantine empire. It is well to recall that no heterodox emperor, from Constantius to Leo the Isaurian, ever proved finally triumphant.

The author brings out certain ironies of the imperial history rather well. For instance, he mentions the panegyric which Pacatus addressed to Theodosius after the defeat of Maximus. The rhetorician pompously informed the Emperor and the Roman Senate (then mostly Christian), "that Spain had given them the God they saw in their midst"! (p. 29).

The chapter on imperial images contains much interesting material that is not easily accessible. The author comes to the significant conclusion that Christians in the fourth century, excepting the bishops, "regularly performed *adoratio* before the Emperor or his statue" (p. 205), though this was doubtless considered as a superficial gesture of respect, and certainly not as *latreia*.

While the circumscribed theme and detail of the work naturally limit its interest to historians and students of Church History, the treatment of the subject is commendable, being clear, succinct and accurate.

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C. C. RICHARDSON.

European Civilization. By Various Contributors. Edward Eyre, ed. Vol. VII, *The Relations of Europe with Non-European Peoples.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 1209. \$6.50.

This is the final volume of a series which began with prehistoric man. It contains a vast amount of detailed information, some of which would be dif-

ficult to find elsewhere and all of which is made easy of access through a copious index. Twenty excellently drawn maps illuminate the text. In other respects the editorial work is less satisfactory. The book is a collection of essays, differing widely in length and merit, some brilliantly suggestive, others little more than the pamphlet of a colonial office. It does seem as though greater harmony of treatment and a better balance of proportions might have been reached without infringing unduly on the writers' independence. As it is, the only unity consists in the fact that they represent uniformly, and with greater or less partisanship, the Roman Catholic point of view. As a natural corollary, they are eulogistic of Spanish colonization and violently hostile to American methods in the Philippines. Of the fifteen essays, nine deal with Africa, and one each with Asia, Australasia, the American Indians and Negro Slavery, while two are general. This singular lack of balance is accentuated by the fact that some are little sketches of twenty pages and one, treating the American Indians (of all things!) covers two hundred and fifty pages. The latter, by W. C. MacLeod, is a savagely hostile but well documented account of the somewhat sorry record of our ancestors in this regard. Illuminating but also unfavorable is Carter G. Woodson's narrative of Negro Slavery, in which Latin Americans are praised above Anglo-Americans. Other distinguished essays are those by Douglas Woodruff on The European Frontier, and the various contributions by A. H. Atteridge, not to speak of the learned article by Margaret Hodgson on Holland in Africa. The work of Roman Catholic missionaries receives stress throughout.

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EUGENE N. CURTIS.

Honest Religion. By John Oman. New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. xi + 198.
\$2.25.

When John Oman died, the manuscript for this book was found on his desk, wrapped and addressed to the publishers. A son-in-law has provided the Introduction, and two former students, George Alexander and H. H. Farmer, have written interesting memoirs. Other friends have helped in the preparation of the volume. It is much simpler than his more famous books (such as *Grace and Personality* and *The Natural and the Supernatural*), but it contains all of his distinctive teaching and in such a manner as to make it particularly helpful and practical.

The themes of honesty, freedom, and commitment to God run throughout these pages as he takes up briefly the major problems of Christian belief: the Father, Jesus as Christ, Lord, and Son, the Kingdom, salvation, forgiveness, revelation, fellowship, wisdom and understanding, confessions of faith, the Church and the churches, outward freedom, and the rule of love.

The title of the book fits it admirably, for Oman was scrupulously honest in his thinking. He measures this desire for honesty against the present political and religious background, against the finalities of mistaken thought and zeal, against hard and fast rules, and against the more extravagant claims of Biblical criticism. "Slavery to tradition, fear of inquiry, submission to institutions are not religion but the want of it, not faith but unbelief. . . . Religion has ever been the

creative force in history, and man's central interest must ever be in reaching forward and upward toward a world not yet realized" (p. 51).

While Oman has lived through four great cycles of biblical criticism, he sees both its complete rejection and whole-hearted acceptance as due to a false view of revelation. Some recent thinkers believe that "revelation is what God says, not what man hears, and that the way to know God's mind is to have no mind of our own" (p. 67). We must see that revelation has two sides, and "the human side . . . is simplicity in the heart and loyalty in the life, without hardness and without evasion" (p. 57). Revelation is God's counsel, which is taken "only when it persuades and becomes our own" (p. 103). "We do not believe except in freedom or prove except by what makes us more free" (p. 85).

As revelation is manifest in freedom and persuasion, so also is God's grace persuasive. "Grace is nothing if it is not the final power; and power is mere force if it is not grace" (p. 95). Compulsion and argument have their places, but only in freedom, in meekness, and in recognition of mystery can we do God's will. And mystery is the challenge to know by following the path in which God beckons us, and as we follow the spiritual and moral trail we see it ever beyond and yet always calling, inspiring, and crowning our endeavor. And the greatest blessing is a Fellowship of the Spirit. "Only the sense of purpose beyond sight, beyond hearing, beyond conceiving, set in a Fellowship of which the human mirrors the Divine, can lead for ever onwards and upwards" (p. 143).

Oman's major contribution to theology lies in his recasting of the relationship between man and God. Without sacrificing the omnipotence of God, he sees so clearly into the freedom which must always guard matters of the spirit that his views of grace, revelation, and the church are fundamentally altered. Grace is *persuasive*, meaning that man is always free to accept or reject the gracious personal relationship which God offers him. Revelation is God's counsel, not his command. He says that "experience is a dialogue, whereby we learn as we ask the right questions and appreciate the right answers" (p. 30). And there can be no finalities in a religion which finds its salvation in the freedom of the spirit. This same spiritual freedom is translated to the Church, which is the Fellowship of the Spirit. Oman would seek unity before union, and base that unity upon the common sharing of the Lord's Supper, which is the common heritage of us all. Following Oman on these three points might bring men more nearly to a truly catholic church!

There is a wise and mellow spirit in this book which strikes more to the heart than to the mind, and at the same time the uncompromising honesty of its presentation captures also the rationalizing processes and leads them into more humble tasks. Oman's last gift to theology speaks to the meanings and joys of Christian living, with an undogmatic conviction which is more contagious than finalities can ever be.

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RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER.

Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. By J. Glenn Gray. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941, pp. viii + 104. \$1.50.

This little book concerns the influence of the Greek spirit and thought upon Hegel. After a short discussion of Hegel's "vision of history" the author relates the development of the young Hegel as it has become known to us through the publication of the so-called "theologische Jugendschriften" by Hermann Nohl in 1907. The young thinker looked with admiration and envy on the national religion of the Greeks, comparing it with a Christianity that had "depopulated Valhalla and destroyed the sacred groves." He longed for an age in which the old pagan ideals might regain their ancient vitality. Hegel never abandoned this enthusiasm, but later on he tried to reconcile it with modern conditions of life. He "always remained a rebel toward his immediate background and tradition" (p. 37). But Gray is forced to admit that the mature Hegel, in contrast to many other German writers of that period, did not believe in the possibility of a rebirth of Greece in Germany. He regarded the Greek world as a limited stage of European history. The Greeks had emphasized the ideal of beauty and tragic necessity, but they had not discovered that of forgiving love.

The author is puzzled by Hegel's "extreme passion for logic," which "prejudiced his historical judgment" (in his lectures on the history of philosophy, especially of Greek philosophy) (p. 81). The viewpoint from which Hegel is "best appreciated" is that of a "comprehensive mythology derived from a sustained vision of history" (p. 92). However, when one accepts this viewpoint the metaphysic of Hegel completely loses the character which Hegel himself attached to it. Hegel stressed the importance of the logical basis of his system precisely because he recognized the essential difference between mythology (or art) and philosophy. To make his philosophy a mythology means to misinterpret his gigantic effort to find an adequate logical solution of the metaphysical problems.

The book has the merit of introducing the reader to modern studies of Hegel's development. It does not add to the results of these studies, but it presents a clear report of them. Of course, this development cannot be fully understood nor the importance of the Hellenic ideal to the system rightly appreciated without taking into account its origin in Kant, Fichte, Schelling and other thinkers whose heir or competitor Hegel was. The impression suggested by this book, that Hegel learnt more from the Greeks than from his contemporaries, is misleading.

It is strange that the author has not used or even mentioned the famous essay "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" (On the Scientific Methods of Treating Natural Law) which appeared in 1802, and which is one of the most important documents concerning Hegel's development in general and his debt to the Hellenic ideal particularly.

Yale Divinity School.

RICHARD KRONER.

The Problem of Liberty. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XVI. Ed. by Charles A. Hart. Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941, pp. iv + 293. \$1.50.

There may be many of us who are unaware of certain phases of the great revolution which is sweeping through the world. There are very few, however, who do not realize at least that human liberty is now in peril. Those of us who are still in a position to gaze upon the struggle with some degree of detachment see this at once. The words tyranny, despotism, slavery rise spontaneously to our lips. Others not so situated are dying to preserve their liberty. Nevertheless it is also clear to all who are capable of considered reflections upon our cultural state that this liberty is not to be identified with the "liberty" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, actually the root of our present disease. To this negative freedom of everything from everything else, this anarchy of liberty, there ought to be, and certainly there can be no return. What then, we may well ask, is that liberty for which we are already preparing to make such sacrifices?

The only hope for real light on the meaning of this difficult, foundational conception is to turn to the religious and philosophical sources upon which our western culture is based. It is, therefore, most appropriate that the American Catholic Philosophical Association should devote its last meeting to the problem of liberty. The Proceedings which make up the present volume range widely through the fields of social philosophy, aesthetics, logic, metaphysics, and theology, and vary greatly in quality. In spite of a certain reliance upon formulae rather than actual intuition, and a certain vagueness in application to the modern scene, which characterize many of the contributions, the volume as a whole suggests many insights to be gleaned from *philosophia perennis* which are of the utmost relevance to our peculiar difficulties. Certainly it should be carefully consulted and studied by all Catholics.

This is especially true of the presidential address of Dr. Francis E. McMahon who rightly calls attention to the general disruptive effects of the philosophic chaos of the past three hundred years, and issues a ringing challenge to the professional philosophers of America: first, to show their contemporaries, by the hard labor of rational reflection and persuasion, that the true insights of classical philosophy are in fact the corner-stone of our culture and our democratic way of life; and second, to assimilate and to maintain the great heritage of European, philosophical scholarship. Anglicans may well envy their brethren of the Roman communion the already widespread grasp of philosophical principles resulting from the great revival of scholastic studies inaugurated under Leo XIII which makes this appeal something more than a mere rhetorical flourish. They should do everything in their power to recapture for themselves those basic truths of philosophy without which Catholic theology and Catholic culture cannot long endure in a healthy state, and to see that the philosophic disciplines are restored to their earlier position of importance in Church schools and seminaries. It is no accident that the secularization of our colleges and universities has proceeded hand in hand with the decay of philosophy as an educational discipline. Let us hope that the Church will rise again to the task, as in past ages of cultural

decay, and that as philosophy languishes and dies away in ever more secularized centers of learning, she will be increasingly revived and cherished in Catholic schools. There is one feature of Dr. McMahon's address, however, which is to be regretted. This is his tendency to use the epithet "Thomism" in referring to the whole range and content of classical and mediæval philosophy. One may question the wisdom of this usage not only on those grounds of persuasive strategy and tact which are at least formally recognized by Dr. McMahon (p. 129), but on the basis of Thomism itself which in its essential spirit is assuredly opposed to emphasizing claims of "originality" and doctrinal ownership. It is no mere factional theory or point of view which is at stake but philosophy herself. Certainly St. Thomas was no Thomist.

Several historical studies attempt to clarify the theological roots of the conception of liberty, which, as Professor A. C. Pegis points out in his article on "Necessity and Liberty" (pp. 1-27), cannot be reconciled with Neo-Platonic emanationism nor with the theological naturalism of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle. According to this view there is no liberty in God. His essence or nature necessarily pours itself out into intermediate causes which in turn produce the world. It was the Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* which freed theology from such necessitarianism, recognized the existence of the Divine *Will*, and thus elevated Liberty into a truly Divine Name, instead of viewing it as a defect of the material creature. On the other hand, the danger of pushing this doctrine to an exaggerated extreme is clearly revealed by Fr. Böhner's interesting but unsuccessful attempt to defend Ockham's wholly unintelligible view of divine predestination and foreknowledge (pp. 177-192). On this view, which identifies freedom with unqualified indeterminism, the divine reason and providence are sacrificed, at least so far as human philosophy is concerned. Recourse must be had to faith. There is no way of understanding, or even of beginning to understand how the rational sovereignty of God can be reconciled either with the *libertas Dei* or with finite contingent facts. It is not difficult to see in this notion the mediæval source of modern nominalism and irrationalism.

Fr. Gerard Smith's article on "Intellect and Liberty" shows the analogous dilemma confronting psychology. If the understanding determines the will, then there is no freedom, since reason is determined by its object, and cannot apprehend it otherwise than it is. On the other hand, if the will is "self-determined" it acts without reason, according to blind necessity or mere caprice. Here again, as in the case of the divine nature, the two alternatives of rational necessitarianism and indeterminism seem equally unacceptable. True liberty is to be found in neither extreme, but rather in the order of hierarchical control.

The salient features of this solution are pointed out most cogently in a remarkable paper by Yves Simon entitled "Liberty and Authority" (pp. 86-114). Here, two senses of indeterminism which are often confused are clearly distinguished. First, there is indeterminism in the agency itself which remains uncertain as to its end. This paralyzes action at its very source, and is inconsistent with true freedom, since it leads to an endless postponement of choice and an acquiescence in the control of lower forces. But there is a second

indeterminism *ad extra*, arising from a super-abundance of causal power. This external contingency is not only consistent with basic certainty of aim, but positively requires it. An artist, for example, to use the illustration of St. Thomas, may have such perfect technical power that he is able to achieve the same effect by the use of two quite different instruments. True freedom thus lies in mastery rather than either sheer contingency or *total* self-expression as two influential, modern theories continue to maintain. Such mastery demands necessity in the end, contingency in the means, necessity *in se*, indeterminism *ad extra*. As Professor Pagis points out (pp. 17 ff.), these two apparent incompatibles, self-necessity and external indeterminism, are perfectly combined in the will of God, whose perfect and eternal end lies necessarily in Himself, but who is at perfect liberty to choose any means, even the willing of an entirely different universe, to realize the end. This is the perfect liberty of God.

Human freedom bears an analogy to this. We cannot avoid willing the ultimate end which is salvation or beatitude. Philosophical or theological indeterminism or unclarity concerning the nature of this end makes us not more free but less free. Since we are only limited beings with limited power, there are also certain means demanded by this end. But as we advance towards the goal, in a path whose general course is determined by reason, we gain a certain mastery over these instruments, and thus a certain true freedom over against them. It becomes, as we say, a matter of "indifference" whether we choose this segment or that, since we have the power to use either to advance us on our way. In this manner, by clinging to the necessary goal, we may come to experience also something which bears an analogy to the divine, creative independence of God with respect to all things other than Himself.

The volume is full of interesting corollaries and historical judgments derived from this Catholic conception of liberty, which combines necessity *in se* with indifference *ad extra*. Thus, as Yves Simon suggests, the modern view that the mere competition of atomic forces must inevitably lead to good, is destructive of true liberty, since it is based on an uncritical optimism concerning automatic forces, which are dependent on what lies beyond themselves and thus certainly not free. Human liberty is gained by passively accepting not what lies below us but what lies above, a passive acceptance which involves the most intense self-mastery. In so doing, however, we gain freedom over ourselves and over all the rest, so far as this is possible, in maintaining our proper station in the order of being. Reason apprehends the nature of the end, and thus provides the formal and the final causes of this ordered liberty, while will, which seeks and chooses, provides the efficient and the final causes in its mode. It is true both that reason directs and determines the will, and that will efficiently determines reason to act, according to the Aristotelian dictum that causes mutually cause one another. Philosophical confusions concerning the complex nature of causation are in no small degree responsible for the distorted theories of liberty which have exerted such a disruptive influence in modern times.

One of the last to struggle unavailingly against these disruptive tendencies was Edmund Burke. In a remarkable paper deserving of special attention Moorsehouse F. X. Millar pays a noteworthy tribute to the practical and theoretical

efforts of this great statesman and scholar, profoundly misunderstood by modern critics, who tried with so little success to keep alive the Aristotleian distinction between practical and theoretical science, and the Christian distinction between ordered liberty and licence. Opposing the Jansenist and Non-conformist view of a totally depraved human nature, which so easily led to modern naturalism, he defended the *lex naturalis* as the real foundation of government, only to be vituperated by his modern critics as a bigoted reactionary. Realizing that all that calls itself reason is not truly rational, he opposed the anti-authoritarian generalizations of Rousseau and the doctrinaire formulations of the French Revolution, only to be hailed as an anti-intellectual. "Their liberty," he said, "is not liberal. Their science is presumptuous ignorance. Their humanity is savage and brutal." Prophetically foreseeing the coming conquest of irrational power to be ushered in by this non-classical, abstract "rationalism," he described in poignant terms the very débâcle we have at last witnessed with our own eyes. "Individuality is left out of their scheme of government. The state is all in all. Everything is referred to the production of force; afterwards everything is trusted to the use of it. It is military in its principle, in its maxims, in its spirit, and in all its movements. The state has dominion and conquest for its sole objects; dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies by arms" (p. 172).

In these poignant pages, as well as in many others, this weighty volume reveals the peril which has attended men's disregard of the subtle distinctions, the wearisome arguments, and the balanced syntheses of *philosophia perennis*. It will be even more perilous for Catholics to disregard them now.

Harvard University.

JOHN WILD.

Paul Becomes a Literary Influence. By Albert E. Barnett. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, pp. xiii + 277. \$2.50.

This volume takes its origin from the suggestion of Professor E. J. Goodspeed that the Epistle to the Ephesians was an 'encyclical' prefixed to the first collection of the Pauline letters, a catena of Pauline passages worked up into a kind of introduction to the collection; and that apart from this collection (inspired by the publication of Luke-Acts) the remaining Pauline letters might never have survived. Dr. Barnett traces the literary influence of the 'published' Pauline collection upon (1) the other, i.e. later, New Testament or early Christian writings (Apocalypse of John, I Pet., Heb., I Clem., John, Epistles of John, Epistles of Ignatius, and Polycarp to the Philippians); upon these he finds that Paul's collected letters exercised considerable influence. The next group (2) reflects a marked subsidence of popularity and influence (Jas., Jude, Hermas, Epistle of Barnabas, Didache, II Clem., Martyrdom of Polycarp, and Apology of Aristides). Finally (3) a third group reflects a return to popularity (II Pet., Tatian to the Greeks, Justin, Melito, Athenagoras, the Pastoral Epistles).

The examination of the relevant passages is carried through with the most careful attention to detail, the Greek texts being set out side by side for close comparison. It is a far more elaborate undertaking than the old Oxford Society of Historical Theology book, *The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*

(1905), which scholars have used for years; and provides much of the data for checking the thesis of such works as Stewart Means's *St. Paul and the Ante-Nicene Church* (1903)—to name an old and useful book by an American Episcopalian.

It is hardly possible to review this study *in extenso*. Of its accuracy we have no doubt; and also that for years to come it will provide scholars with a useful collection of the relevant passages, for New Testament Introduction, and for History of Canon. More than that, it provides an enormous support for the thesis of Dr. Goodspeed regarding the date of the first collection of Paul's letters, and also for his theory of the nature and origin of the Epistle to the Ephesians.

Union Theological Seminary

FREDERICK C. GRANT.

Philosophical Foundations of Faith: a Contribution toward a Philosophy of Religion. By Marion John Bradshaw. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xii + 254. \$2.50.

This is "a volume concerning the attitudes of the founders of modern philosophy toward Christianity." Dr. Bradshaw seeks to overcome the current opinion "that philosophers are not interested in Christianity or in Christ" by showing with ample evidence that the great thinkers of the turbulent seventeenth century were religious men intensely concerned with Christianity. In a series of essays on this aspect of their thought he writes of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Pascal, Spinoza and Leibniz. Descartes, the father of modern scepticism, is a great believer, accepting the Church's teachings, and possessing a genuine piety. Hobbes, "the great materialist," wrestled with the problem of revelation and its tests, and did not teach that man was a mere creature of the state. "The plain fact is that Hobbes was a devout Christian, reserving worship for God alone." Locke, "the great empiricist, was a devout Christian, marked by true humility, and all his epoch-making works show signs of vital faith." Pascal was "the great mystic;" Spinoza looked on "Christ as the one who supremely exemplifies the highest form of life;" and Leibniz cannot be fully understood until it is realized that he studied Christianity intensely and was convinced of the truth of it.

Dr. Bradshaw states that it is not his purpose to attempt to form the differing philosophies of these men into a new harmony. He is concerned chiefly with their "personal religion and with their views of Christ." It would have been of great value, however, if he had shown briefly the unfortunate consequences of some of their thought. Descartes may, in a religious sense, not have been a sceptic, but his method certainly led men to scepticism. The chapters on the philosophers themselves seem to be of real value in that they make clear how far we today, in contrast to the seventeenth century, have drifted from the stream of the Christian tradition. It is in the last chapter that Dr. Bradshaw will meet the most opposition. He leaves the reader with the general impression that men need faith in order to reason, but that what philosophy or creed a man holds is somehow not important. "For efforts of the ablest minds of the past century remind us that the continued influence of Jesus in the

world does not depend upon the acceptance of some one opinion about him." Or again, "there is no one philosophical system which must triumph in order for Christian faith to live." While these statements contain a truth, they fail to recognize the disastrous effects of the "Cartesian faux-pas," or of the instrumentalism of John Dewey with which Dr. Bradshaw seems to have some sympathy.

Episcopal Theological School

RICHARD S. M. EMRICH.

John Hus and the Czech Reform. By Matthew Spinka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, pp. vii + 81. \$1.50.

Since the publication, in 1884, of Loserth's *Hus und Wyclif*, the opinion has widely prevailed that the Bohemian martyr-reformer was hardly more than an echo of the Oxford schoolman, with little independence or originality. It is Professor Spinka's contention, supported by Czech documents, that this opinion is subject to considerable modifications. Hus is here presented as his compatriots have regarded him—the mature product of a native reform movement independent of and in its earlier stages antecedent to Wyclif's reformatory career: a movement essentially practical rather than doctrinal. The Czech reformers, indeed, held Wyclif in high regard and borrowed from him freely as they found his views and program in accordance with their own. But Hus, at any rate, used him with discrimination, and if we are to believe his own testimony at Constance, avoided most of the characteristic Wyclifite 'heresies.' He stood theologically much closer to Catholic tradition than the Englishman. Hence he was not afraid to trust himself to the judgment of the Council, before which political machinations had haled him. If he was a heretic, he was so in the company of the great Augustine.

Professor Spinka is to be congratulated on thus vindicating before the English-speaking world the independence of the courageous Bohemian of whom his people are so justly proud.

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

P. V. NORWOOD.

The Terrible Crystal: Studies in Kierkegaard and Modern Christianity. By M. Channing-Pearce. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. xx + 233. \$2.50.

An English layman surveys and analyses in these essays the dialectic theology of Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner and Heim. Related to this larger theme are short discussions of contemporary writers such as D. H. Lawrence, J. C. Powys, W. B. Yeats and Bernard Shaw. The author manifests a wide reading and study in theology and literature for a layman, and presents his findings with mastery and authority, if not always with lucidity. But his subject matter is certainly not easy to present. He is critical, but at the same time he shares with those whom he studies the viewpoint of crisis and catastrophe as "the essential climate of real religion" and the necessity of "a reborn religion alone" as the only means of averting world-ruin.

The exposition of Kierkegaard, "Denmark's Dead Man," is especially good. The author sees him as a man of "surprising modernity," something like T. E.

Lawrence, with his phobias, conflicts, sense of guilt and dread, and tendency to self-immolation. "Inwardness" and "awareness" are the key-notes of this modernity. One of the best abstracts of Kierkegaard's religion is to be found in the brief paragraph (p. 27) :

"Its foundation is 'dread.' Upon this 'dread' all his religion rests. From dread comes despair, from despair the sense of sin, from the sense of sin the 'instant' of choice, from the choice of Christ, faith itself and the immortal life of the spirit with its sequelae from an initial 'severity' to gentleness, grace, peace, and the love of God."

The author believes that Kierkegaard raised for us the problem of correlating the "twice-born" religion of the prophetic few and the "once-born" religion of most men of goodwill. But today more of his "twice-born" religion is needed by the lay world, where faith must be reconstructed from its very foundations.

The treatment of Barth is solid. Emphasis is placed upon the rugged mountains of Switzerland as a backdrop for his thinking. Of Brunner, the author is critical of his theory of mediation, as "not mediation at all, but annihilation followed by recreation, and the Christ Whom he envisages not a 'Mediator' but primarily a Destroyer and secondarily a Creator of a 'wholly new and other life'" (p. 97). It is here that the author's principal criticism of the dialectical theology comes out, namely the total discontinuity between man and God. What is it, he asks, in man which receives and judges as true the God-given revelation? To say this faculty is God-given only pushes the question back another step. God does not kill the soul in order to remake it. Thus its life-denial is to the author something entirely contrary to the modern spirit, and tends to be an escapism.

Episcopal Theological School

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Homily on the Passion by Melito Bishop of Sardis and Some Fragments of the Apocryphal Ezekiel. By Campbell Bonner. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940, pp. ix + 202, with two plates. \$5.00.

This book is another in the series by Kirsopp and Silva Lake entitled "Studies and Documents." It is a complete and scholarly treatment of the text in hand, since in addition to the able editing of the MS. there are also complete introduction, notes, and indexes. The introductory section touches upon the usual topics found in an edition of a foreign-language text, viz. discussions of author, palaeography, grammar, diction, subject matter, and editions. The text is printed with notes at the bottom of the page, and occupies eighty-one pages for the Homily and five for the Fragment. The book also contains translations of the texts here edited. This work constitutes a desirable addition to our slowly growing corpus of well-edited second century Christian texts. E. J. T.

The Rabbi and His Early Ministry. By Abraham J. Feldman. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1941, pp. x + 146. \$1.50.

Rabbi Feldman delivered these lectures at his Alma Mater on the Alumni Lecture Foundation. Very wisely he drew almost entirely on the experiences of his own ministry over the period of twenty-two years and, as a result, they must have been wonderfully helpful and inspiring to the young men who were in training for the rabbinate. Naturally, he stresses particularly those things which have to do with spiritual leadership. The candidates for the ministry, whether Jewish or Christian, would do well to give good heed to what he has to say about the necessity of having those qualities of faith, courage and social understanding which they are seeking to impart to their people. F. A. M.

Understanding Religion. By Bernard Iddings Bell. New York: Morehouse Gorham, 1941, pp. xiv + 249 + 90. Text \$1.90, note book \$0.50.

The author prepared this book at the request of a committee appointed to study the very important problem of religion in schools. He had in mind particularly seniors in preparatory school and freshmen in college. Starting with the question "What is religion?" he has prepared discussions of all fundamentals of Christian faith and practice. He has accomplished his task with marked success. One who follows carefully through the discussions will find that the successive statements are all built carefully upon the preceding ones. The language is simple and the illustrations used are helpful and pointed. If the advice given teachers and group leaders is carefully followed excellent results should be obtained. The note book published in connection with the text book is a very valuable aid and should certainly be made a necessary part of the course. F. A. M.

Faith and Practice. By Frank E. Wilson. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1941, pp. 340. Textbook edition, \$1.35, \$13.50 per doz.

Bishop Wilson's valuable manual was thoroughly reviewed by the late Charles L. Dibble in vol. XXI of this REVIEW (1939), pp. 219-221. The present edition is paper bound, and twenty pages of questions for discussion have been added. All of this makes it doubly valuable for confirmands and indeed for lay people in general.

Shehitah: a Study in the Cultural and Social Life of the Jewish People. By Jeremiah J. Berman. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1941, pp. x + 514. \$4.50.

Shehitah is the method of slaughtering meat enjoined by the Jewish Law. The average Christian may feel that an exhaustive treatise of the history of the practise such as Dr. Berman has prepared is to him little more than a curiosity. Nevertheless, *shehitah* affects the social life of many of our compatriots and Dr. Berman reminds us that some form of it persisted long in Christianity (pp. 30 f.). An understanding of it helps to give insight into Judaism both in New Testament times and today. Dr. Berman gives a survey of practise in Europe and America, including an account of anti-Jewish legislation in Germany and elsewhere and the curious story of the Shohetim's Union in New York. A few Jewish Negroes have now been trained as shohetim.

S. E. J.

The Return to Religion. By Henry C. Link. New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. vi + 181. \$1.00.

The popularity of Dr. Link's book (reviewed in Volume XVIII [1936], pp. 179 f.) is shown by the fact that this edition, now offered at a reduced price, is its thirty-fifth printing. Though often criticized by theologians for presenting religion as "good for you" rather than as intrinsically true, the book meets people on their own ground and will continue to act as a wholesome influence.

S. E. J.

The Comprehensive Concordance to the Holy Scriptures. By J. B. R. Walker. New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. vi + 957. \$2.00.

For the average clergyman and student, Walker's *Concordance* is probably the most generally useful one which is available. Though it does not classify the words according to their Hebrew and Greek originals, it is claimed to be the most scholarly concordance that we possess for the Authorized Version and to contain 50,000 more references than other concordances. This is a reissue of the volume reviewed in Volume XIX (1937), p. 75, and the price has been reduced from \$3.00. Printed on light-weight, opaque paper, and less than two inches thick, it is especially convenient to handle.

S. E. J.

Quaestiones de Mystica Terminologia ad Mentem Pseudo-Areopagitae et Sanctorum Patrum. By Pascal P. Parente. Washington: The author, 1941, pp. x + 58.

Was Dionysius the source of the later Mystical Theology of the Church or was he only the channel through which the older theology was transmitted? To the solution of this problem this careful Latin dissertation makes a real contribution. Dr. Parente confines his attention to a study of three crucial terms (*mystica, contemplatio, ascetica*) and decides that the Pseudo-Areopagite set forth the traditional meaning and use of these words and that, at least to this extent, his doctrine was not new, but was in the main stream of Patristic thought. The last chapter gives an exact analysis of the meanings, legitimate (*sensu proprio-stricte, late, and latiori*) and illegitimate (*sensu improposito*) of the three terms. The book will be valuable if it does nothing more than lead to a careful use of these much-abused words. Of course, many more studies will have to be made before the main thesis can be established.

W. F. W.


Die neuen Perikopen. By Leonhard Fendt. Tübingen: Mohr, 1941, pp. v + 261. RM 9.10 (bd. 10.45).

The latest volume in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament* is no. 23. It is extraordinary that it should be published in the year 1941 and more extraordinary that a copy should have arrived for review here in America.

The book is a supplement or rather a continuation of volume 22 which appeared just 10 years ago and dealt with "*Die Alten Perikopen*." That volume was by the same author as this—Dr. Fendt, who is a professor in Berlin.

The New Pericopes are the Gospels and Epistles together with relevant Old Testament passages, chosen and approved by the Eisenach Church Conference of 1896. Each section of the book deals with these passages in a suggestive manner, presupposing the critical point of view of the *Handbuch*, stressing the devotional and homiletical application of the passages and concluding with a brief discussion of the liturgical unity of the passages. It is an extraordinarily suggestive work. One wishes that our Prayer Book lessons and Epistles and Gospels had some such running commentary written from the modern point of view and replete with suggestions for preachers and teachers.

F. C. G.



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A Note by the Editor

The ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW is now in its twenty-third year. It represents a labor of love on the part of a group of scholars in the Protestant Episcopal Church who have kept it going, now for almost a quarter-century. It has never had, and has not now, any "overhead" of any kind—salaries, expense accounts, or staff. Its only expenses are for the printing and distribution of the REVIEW. Its resources include subscriptions, a small income from advertising (of theological seminaries), and annual cash contributions made by members of the Editorial Board and the Cooperating Institutions—nine theological seminaries, the Church Congress of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and the Hoffman Foundation. Since 1927, Seabury-Western Theological Seminary has generously provided an office for the REVIEW. It has always been solvent, and continues solvent today, in spite of years of depression and of general economic disturbance throughout the nation.

It exists to serve the Episcopal Church and specifically the theological interests of its clergy and other members. But it is also read by many persons outside the Episcopal Church; a large proportion of our subscribers are libraries, public, college and university, and theological. To all alike it seeks to interpret the Anglican tradition and outlook in theology, a tradition and an outlook which combine wide freedom with firm conviction, comprehension with Catholicity, broad sympathy and understanding with a basic loyalty to the Christian faith "as this Church hath received the same."

Scholarly, authoritative articles by writers of recognized rank; book reviews and notes on new books by experts in their several fields; Notes and Comments, for briefer and sometimes technical contributions; the quarterly *syllabi* of the Church Congress, widely used by study groups throughout the Church—these characterize the ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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